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OCrASIONS

I once knew an eminent teacher and author who insisted that
he would never have written anything if it were not for “occa
sions.” Writing, he asserted (paraphrasing Dr. .Johnson), is an
arduous task, and nobody but a “blockhead” would write if he
were not reasonably certain of an audience.
A main function of The Otterbein Miscellany is to afford an
by which writers in the Otterbein community might
attain an audience. Often writings that appear in this journal find
their way into other publications, but the editors and editorial
board preen themselves on the knowledge that those writings first
appeared here.

occasion

Of the selections which comprise this edition of the Miscel
lany, two deal with sabbatical experiences, two deal with litera
ture, and one deals with local history. Several of the selections
are poems. This edition marks the beginning of the second decade
of publication of the Miscellany. And we wish to thank all those
persons in the past who have made this occasion a success;
editors (especially Professors John Ramsey, Robert Price,
Sylvia Vance), financial-supporters, proof-readers, type-setters
and printers (especially Mrs. Margie Shaw and Mr. f’orest More
land).
The Editor
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Paul L. Reddilt

TOWARD AN UNDl’RS l ANDlNO OF FAITH IN IIIF ROOK OF
Q01!FLI':'III AND AFRl' R I ( AMDS’, MYTH OF SISYPHUS

There is a story — probably apocryphal — that Alfred l;Ord
Tennyson was once asked: what is the most significant question
in the world? To which he replied after some thought: “Is the
universe friendly toward me?” This is simply a diflerent way of
asking the question: can I bear to live; do 1 dare to live? It is
also the question which agitates Qoheleth (f'^cclesiastcs) in the
Old Testament and the modern Algerian Albert (,amus. Qoheleth
was a professional educator noted for his wisdom. He plays the
role of the gadfly, asking stinging questions of his disciples,
challenging their assumptions and ill-conceived theories and
theologies. Basing his teachings upon his one assumption — the
omnipotence of God — and his observations of the world, he asks
a series of questions. Why work, he wants to know, since the
chores will just be repeated tomorrow and generation after gener
ation (1:3-4)? W'hy look or listen since we cannot see or hear
enough to he satisfied (1:8)? Why train in wisdom since we will
never know all we need to know (1:13)? Why laugh when we will
merely turn sad again (2:1)? Why earn money, when we will just
want more (5:10), or lose it (5:13-17), or someone else will spend
it (2:18, 21; 6:1-6)? Indeed, why live at all, since we will all die
sooner or later (3:16-21, 9:2-6 and especially 4:1-3)? By the
same token, Camus wants to inquire whether he could stand to
live in a world which had no meaning in and of itself to offer him.
The greatness of these men lies in their courage to ask such
questions and the profundity of their probe for answers. These
questions, apparently negative in import, actually function to
drive both men to look intently for the significance of life.
Whether their answers are right or wrong is also important, but of
less importance than the facing of the questions.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the questions asked
by Qoheleth and Camus and to assess briefly their answers. 'The
paper is an exposition of the following statement: both Qoheleth
and Camus build similar philosophies of life based on an unwav
eringly critical investigation of the world and irtan s place in it,
resulting as well in a wager affirming the value of an individual’s
life.
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An Analysis of the Book of Qoheleth
R. B. Y. Scott calls Qoheleth the strangest book in the Bible
because instead of articulating a religion of faith, hope, and
obedience, the book expresses its author’s mood of disillusion
ment and resignation. “The author is a rationalist, an agnostic,
a skeptic, a pessimist, and a fatalist (the terms are not used
pejoratively). In most respects his views run counter to those of
his religious fellow Jews.’’* Scott contends that Qoheleth along
with Job and the words of Agur represents an unorthodox wing
more in opposition to than dialogue with the conservative wise
represented in the Bible by Proverbs.^ Gerhard von Rad appears
to go even further. J’he difference between Proverbs and Qoheleth
are for him so striking that he maintains: “Qoheleth is turning
against not only outgrowths of traditional teaching but the whole
undertaking.’’^ These statements are representative of scholarly
opinion, which often goes on to dismiss Qoheleth as an aberration
on biblical faith. While not wishing to minimize the differences
between the “conservative” and “radical” poles of the wisdom
movement in Israel, 1 do not accept the contentions of either
Scott or von Rad. Rather, I hope to show that Qoheleth evidences
considerable harmony with the wise before him, that some of his
so-called “skepticism” is shared by the rest of the Old Testa
ment, and that in his most radical positions he is merely providing
a realistic corrective to certain assumptions of the more conser
vative wing of the wisdom movement. I will do this first by study
ing the nature of Qohelcth’s relationship to the wisdom tradition,
and, second, by summarizing his basic theology. Where possible
I will use the insists of Scott and von Rad themselves to build
my case against them. By deliberately raising the issue of
Qohelcth’s skepticism, I hope to build a platform for viewing him
as a man of faith.
J’hat Qoheleth deliberately positions himself in dialogue with
the developing wisdom tradition is to me quite clear from the
exegesis of Hans Wilhelm llertzberg and Robert Gordis. The
former points to no less than a dozen instances'* in which Qohe
leth puts forth a generally accepted view and then follows with
his own viewpoint in contrast. Robert Gordis has argued cogently
that Qoheleth frequently quotes and/or composes proverbs, and
Gordis has classified the ways Qoheleth uses these proverbs.^
(1) Qoheleth approvingly cites proverbs to buttress an argument
in 7:3, 10:18, and 11:1.*’ Somet imes he even cites a proverb in
toto, while only a part of it serves his purpose: 5:2-3 and 11:3-4.
2

Obviously Qoheleth is employing traditional material in such
cases. In addition, Qoheleth preserves without comment whole
collections of proverbs (10:2-4, 8-20; 11:1-6), which, though
possibly written by Qoheleth, would be perfectly in place in the
book of Proverbs. (2) Qoheleth also quotes proverbs, only to give
them an ironic twist.^ (3) Qoheleth, like the book of Proverbs
before him (cf. Proverbs 26:4-5), uses opposing proverbs back to
back, the second contravening the first (F]cclcsiastes 4:5, 6;
9:16, 18). The question to ask now is clear: what is the nature of
Qoheleth’s dialogue with his tradition? Commenting on Qoheleth s
technique of citing and composing proverbs. Cordis draws a con
clusion that expresses the position of this section of the paper.
His speculations on life did not lead him to abandon his
interest in the mundane concerns of the lower Wisdom; he
merely went beyond them. As he continued to teach the practi
cal Wisdom to his pupils, he doubtless contributed to its
literature, most of which was couched in short, pithy maxims of
a realistic turn. Hence, maxims similar in both form and spirit
to those in the Book of Proverbs are common in Koheleth. 'I’hese
are not interpolations by more conventional readers, as had been
assumed. They belong...to the author’s method of keeping
connection with the past while leaving it behind.^

That is, Qoheleth neither accepts his tradition blindly nor rejects
it completely, but tests it against his own experience, employs it,
modifies it, and sometimes contradicts it. I shall attempt to
demonstrate this dialogical, even dialectical, relationship be
tween Qoheleth and the older wisdom tradition by assessing
further the teaching of Qoheleth in comparison with Proverbs and
in a few instances other parts of the Old 'Pestament.
On the one hand Qoheleth accepts a number of wisdom tenets.
Of the first of these tenets Scott writes about Israel’s wise men
in general:
The wise men...have almost nothing to say about institutional
religion, or about this special relationship of Yahweh and
Israel, past or present. They do not address Israel as such, at
all. They make no direct appeal to the authority of a revealed
religion, though their occ:asional exhortations to piety toward
Yahweh (e.g. Prov. XVI) presuppose an accepted belief. They
speak to and about men primarily as individuals. The authority
to which they chiefly appeal is the disciplined intelligence and
moral experience of good men.^
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Even though Qoheleth shows little or no concern with special
revelation and makes no mention of Israel’s special history, by
these very omissions he stands firmly within the wisdom tradition.
When he does turn to the question of behavior, his concern moves
beyond Torah in the sense of right and wrong to the questions of
whether moral righteousness (1) is possible (7:20), and (2) guar
antees financial success (7:15-18, 8:10-15).
Moreover, the concept of Heilsgeschichte is replaced in Qoheleth’s thought with a concern for the appropriate time to do
things. Von Rad admits that this subject is
from the very
beginning in the center of ancient Near Eastern wisdom
and
that Qoheleth is in agreement with these ideas in the didactic
poem of 3:1-8.*^ But, von Rad asks, of what value is that know
ledge to the wise man if he cannot discern for himself the under
lying order which makes the most divergent modes of behavior
appropriate in their own time. For von Rad, 3:9-15 represents a
clear-cut example of the abandonment of tbe wisdom endeavor by
Qobeletb, an example of his pitching his camp at the farthest
frontier of Jahwism.”^^ Yet the book of Proverbs reads in two
places:
All the ways of ii man are pure in his own eyes,
but the Lord weighs the spirit (Prov. 16:2);
A man’s steps are ordered by the Lord;
how then can man understand his way (Prov. 20:24)?

Other proverbs which indicate either the difficulty in finding
wisdom or God’s human actions could be quoted, but von Rad’s
own comments on these two texts will serve my purpose.
These two sentences do not speak of something experienced or
even evident, but of something unknown, that is of something
which escapes human calculation. In this way the teachers take
a man out of the security of his perceptions and values.... These
are not, of course, general dogmas with which the wise men
confront human stubbornness. On the contrary, behind these
warnings there lie, once again, specific experiences which,
although against the usual run, may not for all that be sup
pressed. Nor did they simply stand as exceptions on the peri
meter; it was not a question of isolated crossshots with which
one had to cope as best one could. 'I’hese unknown factors
could be encountered at any time or in any place in life,...^'l

Fhat is, according lo von Rad himself, traditional wisdom recog
nized its own limits. In my judgment Qoheleth merely makes a
4

virtue of the necessity of this recognition. He says:
For in much wisdom is much vexation and he who increases
knowledge increases sorrow (1:18).

He seems to be saying that the price tag of wisdom is the death
of naivete and the assumption of a human task utterly incapable
of completion. To say, though, that wisdom has its price and its
limits is not to mention what Qoheleth has to say about those
limits. In 3:10-11 he sets them out.
I have seen the business that God has given to the sons of men
to be busy with. He has made everything beautiful in its time;
also he has put eternity into man’s mind, yet so that he cannot
find out what God has done from the beginning to the end.

Qoheleth is saying that man participates in the times God has
ordained for the world, yet he transcends the world. Man can
trace the durationof the world, but cannot uncover the limits of
God s work. The wise man can at most discern that there are
underlying patterns of the universe established by God, but can
not comprehend, cannot organize them for himself into a coherent
whole. Nevertheless, man can be sure that the universe is not
capricious, even if he cannot master all its rhythms. Similarly, in
8:16-17, Qoheleth seems to say that man can observe God at
work, but that very observation gives birth to the recognition that
something in turn transcends man.
When I applied my mind to know wisdom, and to see the business
that is done on earth, how neither day nor night one’s eyes see
sleep; then I saw all the work of God, that man cannot find out
the work that is done under the sun. However much man may
toil in seeking, he will not find it out; even though a wise man
claims to know, he cannot find it out.

The awareness of God’s transcendence by no means turns
Qoheleth into a theological skeptic or drives him to despair. The
knowledge that man uncovers about God can never satisfy man;
it always leaves him awed and wanting to know more. Qoheleth,
then, ever remains open to the fact that he will never know all
about God. This insight is at the heart of biblical faith. One can
only be amazed when any twentieth century theologian interprets
this kind of sensitivity to the problem of theology as antithetical
to Old Testament Yahwism.
From the above, it seems safe to say that Qoheleth stands
5

firmly in the wisdom tradition when he assumes rather than pro
claims the divine commandments and shows more interest in
times*’ than in Heilsgeschichte. In addition, he sees some
advantage to wisdom despite its limits; the advantage, though,
does not necessarily come in the form of fame, fortune, and long
life. Many proverbs^^ found in Ecclesiastes affirm the practical
value of wisdom. Qoheleth says, for example, in 9:16, 18:
...wisdom is belter than might, though the poor man’s wisdom is
despised and his words are not heeded....Wisdom is better than
weapons of war, but one sinner destroys much good.

More problematic, however, is 2:13-17.
Then I saw that wisdom excels folly as light excels darkness.
The wise man has his eyes in his head, but the fool walks in
darkness, and yet I perceived that one fate comes to all of them.
Then I said to myself, “What befalls the fool will befall me
also; why then have I been so very wise?” And I said to
myself that this also is vanity. For of the wise man as of the
fool there is no enduring remembrance, seeing that in the days
to come all will have been long forgotten. How the wise man
dies just like the fool! So I hated life, because what is done
under the sun was grievous to me; for all is vanity and striving
after wind.

This text stands in the midst of a chapter which opens with the
resolve to make a test of pleasure and closes with the conclusion
that to eat and drink and follow one’s vocation is to employ God’s
gifts to man which make him happy, with the reservations that
man and his deeds are ephemeral, the pursuit of those deeds for
their own sake is unfulfilling, and the heir of one’s fortune might
be an incompetent fool. The performance of deeds for the purpose
of making one happy is doomed to frustration and leads to bitter
ness. It is in this connection that verses 12-17 were composed.
In this text Qoheleth affirms the comparative value of wisdom
over folly. Hut his real question is whether wisdom will make
him happy. His answer to that is forthright. No, the thirst for
wisdom is unquenchable and drives one to uncover uncomfortable
tiTiths, such as the common mortality of all men, wise and foolish.
On the other hand, wisdom enables him to learn what does make
him happy, the living of life for its own sake — eating, drinking,
toiling — and prevents his being so attached to these ephemeral
qualities that he is crushed by their loss. Wisdom teaches him
that true happiness is never found except as a by-product of

(>

living one’s life to the fullest. Since happiness is a by-product,
Qoheleth concludes that it too comes from the same God who
gives man his abilities and role in the world.
Qoheleth shares at least one more tenet with other wisdom
teachers, a tenet which does not necessitate the conclusion that
Qoheleth is a skeptic.'’^ Qoheleth has no hope for an individual
resurrection.
For the fate of the sons of men and the fate of beasts is the
same; as one dies, so dies the other. They all have the same
breath [ruach], and man has no advantage over the beasts; for
all is vanity. All go to one place; all are from the dust, and all
turn to dust again. Who knows whether the spirit [ruach] of man
goes upward and the spirit [ruach] of the beast goes down to
earth? So I saw that there is nothing better than that a man
should enjoy his work, for that is his lot; who can bring him to
see what will be after him. (3.19-22, compare also 6:4, 9:1-6)

But in his this-worldly emphasis, Qoheleth shares the opinion of
his “religious fellow Jews.’’ Only in Daniel 12:2 and perhaps
Isaiah 26:19 does the Old Testament proclaim an individual
resurrection.^^ Qoheleth is no more skeptical at this point than
almost any other figure in the Old Testament.
If on the one hand Qoheleth accepts a number of wisdom
tenets, there is no doubt on the other hand that he rejects certain
assumptions in the tradition. Particularly does he reject the
concept of retribution expressed by one line of traditional
teachers that wisdom and righteousness always gain their
records.
The fear of the Lord prolongs life,
but the years of the wicked fall short.
(Prov. 10:27, see also 15:24, 16:22, 19:8)
Be assured, an evil man will not go unpunished,
but those who are righteous will be delivered.
(Prov. 11:21; see also 11:8, 12:21, 13:21, 14:11)

Qoheleth by contrast is as skeptical as Job of individual retribu
tion. In one verse he summarizes his observations.
There is a vanity which takes place on earth, that there are
righteous men to whom it happens according to the deeds of the
wicked, and there are wicked men to whom it happens according
to the deeds of the righteous. I said that this also is vanity.
(8:14, see also among other verses 1:3, 7:1.5-18, 8:10-13).

7

The concept of retribution in Israel has an uncertain history,
the barest outlines of which can be sketched here. It apparently
grew up from the conviction in the earliest wisdom circles of
various types that there is an underlying justice in the world.
Upon reflection, the wise recognized that certain kinds of con
duct are destructive to society and family; hence the general
conclusion was established that proper, orderly conduct issued
in good fortune for a society and its subgroups and that dis
orderly conduct was evil, destructive, and foolish. As long as
Israel thought in terms of collectives rather than interpreting
events with regard to individuals, the concept of retribution
seemed viable. But in time the principle was rigorously applied
to individuals,20 and certain of the Proverbs and the comforters
of Job show how insistent could be the defenders of this applica
tion. Qoheleth, however, came to realize^l that the assumption of
individual retribution is fallacious because it does not take into
account all the variables.
Again I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor
the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the
intelligent, nor favor to the man of skill; but time and chance
happen to them all. For man does not know his time. Like fish
which are taken in an evil net, and like birds which are caught
in a snare, so the sons of men are snared at an evil time, when
it suddenly falls upon them. (9:11-12).

Qoheleth realized that misfortune, untimely death, and a failure
to discern the times properly (to whatever limited extent Qoheleth
thought discerning the times was possible) all negate the work of
the most righteous and wise. Even so Qoheleth nowhere counsels
unethical conduct or the rejection of life.
I find Qoheleth, then, not the pessimist of the Old Testament,
but a sober critic of his own developing wisdom tradition within
the larger context of Old Testament Yahwism. It appears to have
been his objective to establish wisdom on a more solid experien
tial basis than was some of the material he inherited. With this in
mind, one can appreciate more fully the affirmations Qoheleth did
make.
Hertzberg has summarized Qoheleth’s theology in three basic
affirmations.22 The first is the uniqueness (Ausschliesslichkeit,
exclusivicity) of God. Hertzberg appears to mean by this term
God’s transcendence over his world and his determination of the
structures and events of the world. “From birth to death, through
8

every detail of existence, everything is delcmiined by (Jod.”--*
This is something of an overstatement. Qoheleth does not hold to
an absolute determinism, lie seems to say in 6:10 only that man’s
limits are set by one stronger than he.
Whatever has come to be has already been named, and it is
known what man is, and that he is not able to dispute with one
stronger than he.

This need not, I think, rob man of his decision-making ability or
his responsibility for his decisions; rather, Qoheleth only says
that man is born into a world he did not determine. In 9:1 he tells
us that the deeds of the wise and the righteous are in the hands
of God. That is, their final resolution rests with God. None of us
can predict or control the outcome of our deeds. Qoheleth is con
vinced of two things: (1) God sets the limits of man (such as his
span of life and abilities) and the conditions within which he
works, and (2) men acting for even the best of reasons may in
ignorance do the right thing at the wrong time with disastrous
results.24
The second fundamental of Qoheleth’s theology is the vanity
of everything earthly (Eitelkeit alles Irdischen). I’he book opens
and closes on the same note:
Vanity of vanities, says the Preacher, vanity of vanities! All is
vanity! (1:2, 12:8)

The idea that all is vanity appears like a refrain throughout the
whole book.25 The Hebrew term employed is habel, which literally
means vapor or breath. The translation vanity’ was employed
already by l.uther as a derived meaning. Perhaps we would do
better to translate it “transient” or “ephemeral.” In any case,
the emphasis in Qoheleth is on the idea of the qualified nature of
all things earthly over against the absolute nature of their creator.
Scott, then, is simply wrong to call Qoheleth a skeptic or an
agnostic. Hertzberg correctly writes: “For him God is no problem,
neither in his essence nor in his activities, but the single incon
trovertible and incontroverted fact.”26
From the first two elements of Qoheleth’s thought derives the
third. If God sets the limits of man’s existence and man and his
deeds are thereby ephemeral in comparison, there remains only
one sensible course of conduct for man: take the present world
as it is as a positive gift of God and make the most of it. No less
9

than four times27 Qoheleth affirms that man’s lot is to eat, drink,
engage in the toil given to him, and enjoy life with the wife God'
has given him.
Go, cat your bread with enjoyment, and drink your wine with a
merry heart; for God has already approved what you do. Let your
garments be always white, let not oil be lacking on your head.
Enjoy life with the wife whom you love, all the days of your
Lephemeral] life which he ha.s given you under the sun, because
that is your portion in life and in your toil at which you toil
under the sun. Whatever your hand finds to do, do it with your
might, for there is no work or thought or knowledge or wisdom in
Sheol, to which you are going. (;7-10)

To summarize what has been said about Qoheleth, it will
suffice to say that he wants to ask whether life is worth living,
whether man can be happy, in an unfathomable but ephemeral
world created by an even more unfathomable but eternal God. His
answer is no less courageous than his question: yes, life is worth
living if one approaches it without false assumptions and em
braces it despite the risks involved. In the next section of this
paper we shall see that Albert Camus’ vision of life in “The Myth
of Sisyphus” appears similar to that of Qoheleth.

An Analysis of Camus’ “The Myth of Sisyphus”
Sisyphus was the wisest of the ancient mortals, one so wise
he could steal secrets from the gods, chain Death in the under
world, and persuade Pluto to release him back to life to punish
his overly obedient wife. Flventually, however, his impudence
provoked the gods too much, and they consigned him to the
underworld to the seemingly futile task of eternally pushing a
huge boulder to the peak of a mountain, whence it would roll to
the bottom on the opposite side. To Camus this man is heroic,
and his heroism consists precisely in his conscious embracing of
his pointless, unceasing task. By so doing he finds that the
struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man’s heart.
“One must imagine Sisyphus happy.”28
Camus’ argument in “’ITie Myth of Sisyphus” is straight
forward and easily summarized. The essay begins; “There is but
one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide.
Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answer
ing the fundamental question of philosophy.”29 Camus immedi
ately rejects any hope of discovering an overarching “meaning”
10

to the world; rather, the world confronts man as baffling, (lertain
“walls” bring the analytical mind to its limits in its desire for
unity and in the scientific attempt to seize phenomena and
enumerate them. In short, the world in and of itself is not expli
cable.
Philosophers of all ages have been confounded by these
“walls,” and Camus is strongly attracted to modern existentialist
writers who have tried to deal with the world as absurd, such as
Heidegger, Jaspers, Chestov, and above all Kierkegaard. Yet, he
claims, these men have committed “philosophical suicide,” for
they have made a “leap of faith,” laying hold of the Eternal, to
overcome the wall against which their logical minds have driven
them. Indeed he writes, “...the most paradoxical and most signi
ficant irrationality is certainly the philosophical leap that
attributes rational reasons to a world it originally imagined as
devoid of any guiding principle.”30 Camus wants nothing to do
with that leap. Rather, he fastens to the doomed stmggle for
meaning, contending “that that struggle implies a total absence
of hope (which has nothing to do with despair), a continual
rejection (which must not be confused with renunciation) and a
conscious dissatisfaction (which must not be compared to im
mature unrest).”31 According to absurdist philosophy, man finds
himself confronted by a paradoxical universe. Philosophical
suicide capitulates to the paradox by eliminating the irrationality
of the world, and physical suicide capitulates by eliminating the
human caught in the paradox. Therefore, neither is a solution to
the problems of absurdity, and both are but attempts to escape
the problems. Camus intends, therefore, to be true to the entire
absurd situation. Indeed, he maintains, that the world is absurd
is the one dictum of which he can be sure.
This dictum raises for Camus the question of man’s freedom,
a subject which he separates from the question of man’s stance
over against God. “h'or in the presence of God there is less a
problem of freedom than a problem of evil. You know the alterna
tives: either we are not free and God the all-powerful is respon
sible for evil. Or we are free and responsible but God is not
all-powerful. All the scholastic subtleties have neither added
anything to nor subtracted anything from the acuteness of this
paradox.”32 Hence, man aware of the absurd lives without con
ventional metaphysics, aware that his freedom has no meaning
except in relation to the limits of his certain fate of death.
Individual ethics depends, then, not on an external principle, but

upon one’s experience, and the quality of his experience depends
upon oneself rather than on one’s circumstances. One makes
those circumstances meaningful by a passionate, liberating revolt
against the certainty of death (rejecting suicide along the way),
and thereby gains the power to wring the most out of life. The
goal of the absurd man is to expend all he has so that the
inevitable death becomes negligible.
Camus gives us a battery of absurd heroes to emulate. “To
the destructive transgressors - Caligula, Jan, and Maria - Camus
opposes a gallery of truly ‘absurd’ heroes: the actor, Don Juan,
the conqueror, the creative artist, and finally, subsuming all,
Sisyphus.’’33 In all of these figures there is an “element of
glamorous titanism,”34' a zest for life in spite of life. All of
these figures are constantly consuming and moving from one role
to another, one woman to another, one adventure to another, one
composition to another; indeed: “The rock is still rolling.’’35
All of these figures are creating their own absurd universe. “In
that daily effort in which intelligence and passion mingle and
delight each other, the absurd man discovers a discipline that
will make up the greatest of his strengths. The required diligence,
the doggedness and lucidity, thus resemble the conqueror’s atti
tude. To create is likewise to give a shape to one’s fate.... A
world remains of which man is the sole master. What bound him
was the illusion of another world.”35
With Camus’ argument before us, it is possible now to begin
an analysis of the essay. By beginning with the question of
suicide, Camus finds far more than a mere attention-getter. He
thrusts the philosophical question of man’s existence precisely
where it belongs — in the realm of experience and ethics. His
basic thesis in “The Myth of Sisyphus” and other works is
expressed by Germaine Bree: “metaphysical pessimism does not
entail that one must lose hope for man, quite the opposite.”37
True, Camus finds no metaphysical hope and cannot imagine what
metaphysical salvation would entail. Rather, he separates the
question of a meaning in life in the sense of a superimposed
meaning from the question of whether man can create his own
meaning and make life worth living,38 and he affirms the latter
option.
If, then, man lives in a non-metaphysical world, how does he
transcend it to find meaning? (Indeed, Camus admits that the
difference between himself and a tree or an animal is his ability.
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in fact his need, to seek coherence.) If he lives in an absurd
universe, what value is Camus’ rational analysis? (It must have
some value or he would not write a hundred page essay.) What, in
fact, does Camus mean by the term “absurd”? Tbe absurd is
essentially a divorce between expectation and result.3^ “The
absurd is lucid reason noting its limits.”'*® In other words,
absurd” is a synonym for non-sequitur, without denying the
limited success of man’s reason. As John Cruikshank defines it,
the absurd is for Camus “... a relationship of nonconformity
between the individual and the world. The absurd is not a ‘thingin-itself’ but the confrontation of two things other than itself —
existence and an individual mind.”'** The word signifies “the
absence of correspondence or congruity between the mind’s needs
for coherence and the incoherence of the world which the mind
experiences.To call this world “absurd” is less to challenge
physical cause and effect than it is to admit one cannot quite
comprehend causality and to come to live with that admission
without succumbing to it. “The absurd has meaning only in so
far as it is not agreed to.”‘*3 Moreover, “the absurd, which is
the metaphysical state of the conscious man, does not lead to
God”.'*'* But neither does it assert God’s nonexistence; it simply
finds the concept of God meaningless. Camus will base his case
only on facts,‘*5 and these are enumerated as death, a knowledge
of his wants, a knowledge of history, and the realization that he
does not know any transcendent meaning.
Of these facts, only the first and the fourth are surely known
to Camus, and the first by inference from other humans, not
personal experience. Hence, Camus is attempting to build a
system squarely on the experience of the absurd. “As Descartes
derived the certainty of his existence from prior doubt concerning
it (I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am), so Camus derives
meaning from his existence from an original denial of the possi
bility of meaning.”'*® He rejects Kierkegaard’s view that a leap
of faith represents an extreme danger which is simultaneously
life-authenticating. He says: “'I’he danger, on the contrary, lies
in the subtle instant that precedes the leap. Being able to remain
on that dizzying crest — that is integrity and the rest is subter
fuge.”'*7 Here is the crux of the matter: remaining on the crest.
If one is able to stand on that precipice, a new vista is opened
up below. “The absurd man thus catches sight of a burning and
frigid, transparent and limited universe in which nothing is
possible but everything is given and beyond which all is collapse
and nothingness. He can then decide to accept such a universe
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and draw from it his strength, his refusal to hope and the un
yielding evidence of a life with consolation,”48
llie language of this last quotation deserves comment. When
Camus here speaks of the “universe,” he is referring to more
than physical matter. The sentence can only refer to the structures
of existence as they are for him, shorn of metaphysical standing
or meaning, and, hence, not eternal, but capable of sustaining a
given type of existence, no matter how truncated it might seem to
some. It is surely this understanding of “universe” which also
stands behind the life-illuminating insight of Meursault in The
Stranger as he awaits execution:
It was as if that great rash of anger had washed me clean,
emptied me of hope, and, gazing up at the dark sky spangled
with Its signs and stars, for the first time, the first, I laid my
heart open to the benign indifference of the universe.49

The “universe,” then, is indifferent to man, but not hostile.
Moreover, man must choose whether to accept the universe so
construed or to make the leap of faith. Camus writes: “Is one
going to die, escape by the leap, rebuild a mansion of ideas and
forms to one s own scale? Is one, on the contrary, going to take
up the heart rending and marvelous wager of the absurd?”^0
Cruikshank focuses on the choice of term “wager”: “By such
revolt we wager in the opposite direction to Pascal: we assert
the marvelous and harrowing wager of the absurd....”51 From one
perspective Camus’ wager stands at the opposite end of the
spectrum from Pascal, but from another perspective his affirma
tive intention and commitment are very similar to Pascal. The
affirmativeness of this wager becomes even more clear if we
compare Camus’ trilogy of revolt, passion, and freedom with
Paul’s faith, hope, and love. For Camus, “faith” is the abondoning of one’s critical faculties in philosophical suicide, “hope”
falsely robs the present in the name of the future, and “love”
concentrated on one being (or one sexual partner) is potentially
enslaving or at least limiting (though to live without loving is
misfortune). By contrast, Camus revolts out of sheer passion,
indeed anger, refusing to bow before his limitations and living
defiantly of death itself. Paradoxically he argues that man is not
truly free until he squarely confronts all his limitations and sees
death for what it is — the inevitable end of every man, an end
which no power in the universe can prevent, but which the
“absurd” life can rob of its sting.52 This is the only metaphysic
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to which Camus will admit, lucidity in the face of what negates it.
Between Camus and the universe there is no quarter asked and no
quarter given, no cheap sentiment, but no hostility either.
This brings one to the final matter which requires attention in
Camus’ system of thought, his ethic. At first sight it appears as
though Camus were a hedonist. Indeed, he refuses to build a sys
tem of ethics;^3 he is driven to say that what counts is not the
least living but the most living, and he justifies the life style of
Don Juan as a seeking for liberty.'’'^ But to call him a hedonist is
a misreading of Camus. That everything is permitted does not
mean, he says, that nothing is forbidden. ’ ’ I he absurd merely re
minds one of the common fate of all men. Don Juan the sensualist
becomes Don Juan the hermit, not out of repentance but out of an
understanding of the absurd. “The lover, the actor, or the adven
turer plays the absurd. But equally well, if he wishes, the chaste
man, the civil servant, or the president of the Republic.”'’^ J’he
key is not in what one does, but in doing it defiantly and without
illusion. In the revealing light of the absurd, the most apparently
contradictory modes of behavior can be seen to be complementary.
The key to Camus’ ethic, it seems to me, is the sentence
“That everything is permitted does not mean that nothing is
forbidden.” Elverything is permitted because there is no eschato
logical punishment, and the self-appointed judges on earth insist
on proclaiming guilty those who feel only innocence. Neverthe
less, he does not recommend crime, for that would be immature.
In the early days of World War II, Camus was forced to make more
explicit what was implicit in “The Myth of Sisyphus.” In his
Letters to a German Friend, written at the height of the war, he
articulates his position.
We long agreed that the world had no superior reason and that
we were stuck in an impass. 1 still believe this in a certain
manner. But I have come to other conclusions than those about
which you spoke to me and which for many years you have
attempted to introduce into history. 1 say to myself today that if
1 had really acquiesced in what you think 1 would have to admit
your good reason in what you are doing. And that is so grave
that it is necessary for me to stop in the heart of the night
which holds so much promise for us and is so menacing toward
you.
You have never believed in the meaning of the world, and you
have accepted the idea that everything is equivalent and that
good and evil can be defined as one wishes....You have con
cluded from this that man is no thing... .And to tell the truth, 1,
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believing as I thougjit you did, saw no means to argue against
you, except a fierce love of justice which after all seemed to
me as flimsy a reason as the most sudden passion.

Indeed justice, human justice, has its claims after all. Not all
conduct is equivalent. Any revolt which obstructs human justice
is to be shunned, not because of divine retribution, but because
of human honor and life. Jean Onimus says of Camus’ position:
“To opt for man, that is to say for life, is to proclaim the exist
ence of a good and thus escape from contingency, from despair —
and from the cynicism that results from it....These values
[justice, honor, etc.] will henceforth play the role of the absolute;
the religion of man is substituted for pious or cynical resignation
to Disorder.”^® Indeed, Dr. Rieux pens his chronicle about the
plague “to state quite simply what we learn in a time of pesti
lence: that there are more things to admire in men than to des
pise.
Thus even the absurd man must eventually affirm
conduct productive to man and disavow that which is destructive
of life, because unjust conduct, like suicide, merely eliminates
the human end of the polarity of existence. This disavowal is as
consistently applied in the Letters against a government as it
was in “Myth” and in The Stranger against the “Christian”
notion of a present-robbing hope for the future.
To summarize what I have said about Camus, let it suffice to
say that he wants to know if life is worth living in an unfathom
able world, which is at best benignly indifferent to him. His
answer is no less courageous than his question: yes, life is
worth living if one approaches it without false assumptions and
embraces it resolutely, wagering that living as an absurd creator
is more meaningful than living as one who looks outside the
world for someone to solve all of man’s self-created problems.
The agreement of Camus with Qoheleth is striking, though not
complete.

Conclusion
It remains nov to con pare and contrast Qoheleth and ‘Myth of
Sisyphus” and to assess their insights. The points of similarity
which are most striking are two. First of all, the author of each
is acutely aware of the limits of man’s ability to understand his
world. Both agree that, theologically speaking, it is blasphemy to
suppose that man can encompass God. Rationally, it is impossible
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to scale the barriers which ultimately frustrate all attempts to
build systems. In the second place, both men make a wager about
how to live authentically. That is, both men make a virtue out of
their impasse, embrace the paradox in which they find themselves,
and seek to squeeze all the zest they can from life lived in the
human condition in which uncertainty and frustration leer over
every accomplishment.
On the other hand, Qoheleth and Camus disagree over several
key issues. For one thing, Qoheleth i.s a theist. I he existence of
God is not an issue which he can bracket out of his discussion as
Camus can. Yet God remains unfathomable to Qoheleth. (.amus,
while not denying the existence of God, has undergone what
William Hamilton calls the “experience of the absence of God”^’*’
and has structured his world accordingly. Qoheleth sees the
sequence of days, seasons, years, generations, that is, the
dependable repetitiveness of many phenomena, and concludes
that the universe has an underlying order. He is also aware that
neither he nor any other mortal can fully discern that order, though
assuredly God, its author, understands it. Camus sees no gain in
positing a God who understands even if man does not. But the two
perspectives lead to the same end for both. I hey counsel their
readers to embrace the world in all its ephemeral absurdity and
find fulfillment in so doing. There is a second difference which
must also be mentioned. Qoheleth never advises one to revolt
against his circumstances; the encounter is much more tender.
One might almost hear Qoheleth say: To revolt is but to engage
in vain striving and miss what meaning one can find. Camus, by
contrast, seems to say: “Etch your meaning by defiance, by
refusing meekly to surrender to the inevitable death. Perhaps,
though, we might ask if Qoheleth’s readiness to believe God
knows is not also a kind of defiance of things as they appear.
Perhaps the only difference between Qoheleth and Camus is
Camus’ empiricism, his refusal to resort to or deal with the
category of God.
In assessing the significance of these men, I will again dis
cuss'only two aspects. First, both Qoheleth and Camus contribute
to an understanding of man’s relationship to his world. Perhaps
less profound than Camus is Qoheleth, who thinks the world
moves in its own time and any calamity is due to man s bad
timing rather than any disfunction in the world. For Camus the
world offers to man its pleasures and satisfactions, its lessons
and its healing. We must look outside of the “Myth of Sisyphus,”
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though, to see what he says. As a youth in Algiers he learned
that the world should be lived in and enjoyed, for Algiers itself is
said to be open to the sky like a mouth. Men who drink from the
world live wholly in the present, without myths, without solace.
To place one’s hope in the future is not to avoid resignation, but
to resign to the present, indeed to life. “For if there is a sin
against life, it consists perhaps not so much in despairing of life
as in hoping for another life and in eluding the implacable
grandeur of this life.”^* Algerian summers thus taught Camus
how to live, how to open himself to the benign indifference of the
universe. In the midst of the plague Rieux and Tarrow experience
the same therapeutic quality of nature. They steal to the sea one
night to swim because they cannot live only to fight the plague,
and they return to the city “conscious of being perfectly at one”
to set their shoulders to the wheel (stone!) with renewed vigor.^^
Camus learned, moreover, not to separate men “bursting with
violent energy from the sky where their desires whirl,and
from nude swimmers on a Mediterranean beach he learned men live
among bodies through their own bodies, thereby becoming aware
that the body has a psychology of its own.^'* In short, both
Qoheleth and Camus insist that we affirm our basic dependence
upon the world which sustains us, its grandeur, its appropriate
ness. They warn us against an unnaturalness which denies our
physical source and against a futuristic hope which robs the
present.
Finally, it is possible to draw some conlcusions from the two
which aid in a definition of faith. Qoheleth, by his striving for
wisdom without expecting guarantees of success, and Camus, by
his titillating walk along the harrowing precipice, demonstrate
several of its elements. First, while faith is a gamble, even a
revolt, it is not an escape from the fathomlessness, even the
meaninglessness of things. Paul Tillich, aware of the “walls”
discovered by Qoheleth and Camus, asks if there is
...a kind of faith which can exist together with doubt and
meaninglessness,..How is the courage to be possible if all the
ways to create it are barred by the experience of their ultimate
insufficiency? There is only one possible answer, if one does
not try to escape the question: namely that the acceptance of
despair is in itself faith and on the boundary line of the courage
to be. In this situation the meaning of life is reduced to despair
about the meaning of life. But as long as this despair is an
act of life it is positive in its negativity
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That is, faith incorporates doubt and meaninglessness within
itself and can even be reduced to a “positive despair ’ as a
result of that incorporation. Second, such a faith is presentoriented. It does not rob the present for the sake of the future.
This point has been so often made in this essay that it needs no
further discussion. Third, it rests upon an awareness of an inde
finable quantum (whether it is called God, the Unconditional, or
the will for life itself) experienced in the very being of man. Ihis
awareness results in the convictions that life is very worth living
(even in the worst of circumstances), and that man must repudiate
every idol, every objectification, every system that would rob
him. This is obviously so for Qoheleth, who thought man’s life
was a gift from God, and Nathan Scott writes of Camus in this
connection;
It is true, of course, that in him a very radical scepticism had
undercut most of the concrete symbolism of Christian faith, and
a profound impatience with conventional religious apologetics
inhibited any decisive movement in the direction of the meta
physical personalism of biblical faith. But surely it is clear
that in Camus there was an equally profound sense of the
“transpersonal presence of the divine” which is also an element
of biblical faith; and we have, I think, ample testimony in his
writings that this was for him a rich and deep source of the
confidence and the courage that enabled him to go “beyond
nihilism.” So perhaps this was a modem man who did not
altogether live outside the realm of grace.

Fourth, there is something profoundly anti-religious (that is,
contrary to the objectification of forms, symbols, myths, dogmas,
and rites) about this faith which is simultaneously the essence of
true religion. Again Tillich writes: “True religion exists whereever the Unconditional is affirmed as the Unconditional, and
religion is abolished through its presence...Absolute religion is
never an objective fact, but rather a momentary and vital break
through of the Unconditional.”^’^ Camus himself penned this
statement, which expresses as clearly as Tillich ever did the
Protestant principle: “I understand then why the doctrines that
explain everything to me also debilitate me at the same time.
They relieve me of the weight of my own life, and yet I must
carry it alone.”68
F'inally, faith is not itself reducible to logic; it is not just
another system leading to another “wall.” As Richard Taylor
writes, “Faith is not reason else religion would be, along with
logic and metaphysics, a part of philosophy, which it assuredly
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is not,Nor is it simply an assumption or mere tenacity. Faith
is in fact “an involuntary conviction”^^ which grasps one even
though he cannot ultimately reason it out. So Qoheleth and Camus
reject nihilism and cling to life, despite their analyses, or
perhaps as a consequence of their analyses.
Karl Jaspers pictures the believer in revelation and the
philosopher as men in two different camps whose fundamental
convictions are mutually exclusive. He asks if there can be
common ground, if the two faiths can meet. He replies that they
can only cooperate and can do so precisely because each one
faces his own doubts. In this cooperation the believer cannot
“expect of others, as an act of will, what he has received as a
gift of divine grace.By the same token, the philosopher must
“be constantly ready to hear the other’s experience and to join
in all human tasks in the world.2 Qq not Qoheleth and Camus
stand as representatives of this meeting of the two camps?
Qoheleth accepts his assignment from God to learn about the
world (1:13) and is aware that his discovery is the gift of God
(9:J), and yet this knowledge is less than the full truth (3:11,
8»17). Camus, for his part, does not take issue with Christianity,
or with biblical faith per se. He is quite willing to join with the
Christian whose hope is not a present-robbing grasping after a
future life. “It is possible to be Christian and absurd.”’^^ The
distance between the two writers is from my perspective attribut
able to the ineffability of God.
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At sun-up, through the years.
Our father saw, or seemed to see.
Black texts emblazoned clear and firm
Across the banner of each dawn.
“Another day!’’ his knock on bedroom doors
Proclaimed. “Wake! Stir!
Get to your chores! Think well
Lest time slip uselessly away!’’
The years would tell us he had dressed his words
In tailoring of another age. But the suit
Was paid for and he wore it well,
Lven at the threadbare close.
There were runs of rage, though.
Let loose on days when maybe the text he saw
Was only an ugly scratching
On a crowding wall.
He must have known then that the precepts
He so firmly kept in shape
Could never save us from our own dark gravelings
After broken letters in a scrabble heap.
Robert Price
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HORTUS IMFECCARILIS

“Weeds are sin,” my aunt would say
Bringing her hoe down like a thunderclap
And (so it seemed to me) a bit self-righteously.
She was always chopping away at life with some old saying
Taught by her Cambrian forebears.
As for weeds, hoeing wasn’t enough. I had to yank
Shepherd’s purse and dandelions out by the root
And tug at mallows till the Chinaman
At the other end let go. Wild buckwheat!
It actually had the Devil’s spear-tail for a leaf!
After potatoes were in the bin and turnips pulled.
She liked to show her “clean patch” to some neighbor
And shame him for his wilderness
Of grass and pigweed. She had never heard of humus
Or thought that topsoil needs protection.
So she weeded out the evil.
And fall rains washed away the good.
I’ve changed my mind a lot on weeds and sin.
Both snatch up idle patches, but a weed
Usually leaves a little something for its keep.
Robert Price

2.5

Al Lovejoy

THE WOMEN’S KEl OKMATOKY AS VICTIM

As its name suggests, a women’s reformatory should re-form or
rehabilitate the individual who is sentenced to serve a portion of
her life there. It is my opinion, having just returned from a tenweek sabbatical as observer-participant in Ohio’s only penal
facility for adult female offenders, that the public mandate of
reformation is a futile and a ridiculous one, given the conditions
which I shall try to describe.
Among the “givens” of incarceration are the goals which any
penal institution is supposed to try to attain. These goals in the
United States today are: (1) punishment, (2) deterrence, (3) reha
bilitation, and (4) security. The greatest of these is security. It
is greatest because by popular and legal opinion this is the main
function of incarceration — namely to get the individual off the
streets where she has been offending against property or persons
and to put her in a place where her activities can be controlled
and rendered innocuous as far as the rest of the world is con
cerned. It is my conviction, and many practical as well as
theoretical penologists would agree, that security (head counts,
travel passes, low-risk work assignments, etc.,) are not neces
sarily conducive to reformation.
Punishment, the first goal listed, is psychologically and
physically antithetical to rehabilitation. Since the vast majority
of inmates return to society, rehabilitation is the only sensible
goal. What does reformation involve that makes it so incongruent
with punishment? It involves ego building, educational upgrading,
emotional support and re-inforcement, and the freedom necessary
to insure the vitality of the creative processes. One may argue
that the modern female penal facility is not basically a place of
punishment, but I would contend that for American women, at
least, losing one’s freedom of movement, being deprived of some
of one’s intimate personal possessions and routines, being
subject to institutional court actions for infractions of the
reformatory’s rules, and being forces to live with a large group
of diverse felons of the same sex in a strange rural atmosphere —
all of th is is indeed punishment enough!
As for the second goal, deterrence, all I need to say, perhaps.
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is that the consequences of incarceration for misdeeds observed
and punished are not always kept sharply in focus by an encaged
individual who hopes that if and when there’s a next time, “they
sure as hell won’t catch me!’’ Deterrence surely works for as
long as those who are locked up stay locked up, but as far as
outsiders are concerned, the sight of a prison or jail, even the
sight of prisoners and their keepers, may result in the smug feel
ing expressed in “Am I glad I’m out here!’’ or ‘“ITiat’s what may
happen to the stupid, some of the desperately poor, the ignorant,
the unlucky, but not to me!”
By common consent among both keepers and the kept, the goal
of rehabilitation is rarely if ever realized. Why? b’or these
reasons, I believe;
Governors, legislatures, and the general
public are not clear in their penal philosophies as to whether one
program or another will effect real reformation. Not only this, but
political figures come and go and so do programs and the public
support for them. And where is the political advantage in being
an advocate for “criminals”? Without even hinting at lack of
official interest or the breakdown of volunteer effort or the mis
apprehensions of well-intentioned people, our society just has
not made the simple humanitarian commitment to provide analysis,
diagnosis, therapy, and long-term treatment for our locked-in
fellows who may be alcoholic, drug-addicted, neurotic, or border
line psychotic. We don’t even yet provide these services to all
needful non-offenders in a systematic, inexpensive, and unembar
rassing way! It seems safe to assume that given the structure of
our complex, amoral, urban-industrial society, there is no way to
provide such help adequately at this point in history.
Even in normal times (to say nothing of a period of social and
economic dislocation and recession) it is hard to get public tax
support for “the dregs” of our society when the taxpayers con
ceive of themselves as law abiding, decent, honest, unaggressive,
hard-working, peaceful citizens. “Law and order” is the hallmark
of much of middle-class public opinion, and since one mistake
may be taken to be indicative of one’s life style, we don’t give
the ex-con many second chances. Who is likely to lobby for folks
who are neither taxpayers, property owners, nor voters? If the
stigma of criminality is a life-time label, as it unquestionably is,
how much reformation or rehabilitation should we expect?
It has been estimated that ten percent of all criminals reach a
reformatory after the filtering process has taken place. Since
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those who are actually incarcerated are folks who are of lower
socio-economic status, as well as being socially, educationally,
and religiously deprived, how can we expect these “street
realists” to be over-optimistic about their chances for rehabilita
tion to the values and practices of the “straight” world outside
the reformatory?
If they are befriended, guided, supported, and loved by the
institutional staff, possibly they may make it, but how many of
them can we expect to be this fortunate? If from an early age you
have had to scratch for all you have ever attained, and that “all”
has been meager indeed, what will motivate you to go straight
when some of those around you are doing so much better finan
cially and otherwise at their illicit crafts? Especially is this
pessimistic appraisal plausible, it seems to me, when the worst
that can happen to you is to be caught, found guilty, and sen
tenced to good food, a small comfortable room, and sufficient
clothing, at the least, and much more than this once you have
become prison-wise and can make the system work for you. All
this and you are actually among some of the most caring, protec
tive, and dedicated staff prople you will ever run into whose
sole purpose is to keep you healthy and alive in that statesupported facility. There you may find better friends among your
fellow inmates than it has ever been your good fortune to have on
the streets; a psychiatrist in the reformatory hospital may soften
the blows of life for you; free recreation is provided periodically;
if you haven’t completed your education, there are courses and
labs designed to help you reach the high school equivalency
standard; you may even stay long enough to learn a new useful
vocation or sharpen up an old one; if you are bright, university
correspondence courses are available for your diversion and self
improvement. After having said all this, 1 do not wish to leave
the impression that reformatory life is just a succession of fun
and games for the poor; obviously the loss of freedom is onerous
even for those whose lives are unstable, impecunious, and often
fraught with hazards to health and survival itself. Being immured
against one’s will and forced to live among dreaded strangers who
have committed all manner of crimes is no bowl of cherries!
The recent past with its Watergate syndrome lives on to haunt
people who work with conventional criminals. It has helped
buttress some of the common cliches about there being a “little
larceny in everyone’s soul,” “every man has his price,” “it’s
not what you know, but whom you know,” “if you’re lucky, you
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get it cheap or even free,” ‘‘middle class people can keep out of
jail through money, influence, or clout,” and ‘‘certain people are
really social class, political, or racial prisoners of The System.”
In many ways these easy and trite generalizations have just
enough truth in them to help one find ‘‘reasons” for his bad luck
in being locked up when CIA, FBI, and other federal agencies,
and officials are trying to ‘‘stonewall” their way through illegal
past actions by using rationalizations no longer acceptable in a
new era demanding open revelation and honesty in public policy
and among public officials. How can a common criminal feel any
sense of shame when a resigned President and his closest aides
still hold onto the transparent myth of only having made ‘‘mis
takes in judgment”? Mass media today reveal to the humblest
citizen exactly what the emperor’s new clothes are made of!
These trends, plus seismic changes in societal mores in regard
to human sexuality, man-woman relationships, the sacredness of
contacts, the ease of personal as well as corporate bankruptcy
proceedings, etc., tend to erode the old boundaries between right
and wrong, between legal and illegal, between natural and un
natural, between fair and unfair, between honest and false. So
how can we be surprised when the people who are most vulnerable
to the shock waves of seeming post-(.hristian, post-capitalist,
post-democratic collapse appear confused and unable to look at
their own rationalizations and alibis objectively and critically?
The high turnover rate of resident-inmates is another factor in
making programs of rehabilitation almost certain of at least
partial failure. If the institution has little or no control over the
entrance and exit of its “clients,” how can sustained, welldeveloped, meaningful programs of reformation be carried out?
County sheriffs bring newcomers in whenever they are ready to do
so. The reformatory must take them into Admissions as they
arrive. Since the average stay of an inmate is now about one year
(1974), and since she anticipates shock probation, shock parole,
furlough plans, review hearings, and/or regular parole board
hearings, the average prisoner has a strong sense of tentative
ness. She, indeed, often tells prison officials that the sentencingjudge has promised her that she is likely to be released early for
shock probation! The intensity of desire can surely color judicial
suggestions in the minds of resident-inmates whose whole incli
nation is toward that happy day of release from “the fam.” The
inmates have an uneasy sense of the transient nature of their
stay in the penal facility. Consequently ephemeral mind-sets,
weak morale for sustained effort, and wishful thinking (fantasies
of imminent freedom) weaken and make difficult the proper use of
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counseling, habit-change programs, educational upgrading, and
vocational renovation.
Another word could be said about staff turnover. Both on-thefiring-line level correctional officers and some of the profes
sionals are apt to have higher than average turnover for these
reasons: (1) Working in a closed setting can be somewhat stifling
for many freedom-loving Americans. (2) Having to be constantly
aware of demands for security and punishment can lessen the
professional’s morale and commitment in practicing his art and
make him wonder how he might fare on the outside with a more
prepossessing group of clients whose desire for improvement
might be more explicit and obvious. (3) Being a member of a
great bureaucracy, such as any large state agency must of
necessity be, is a sobering and at times very frustrating experi
ence. (4) Finally, being some distance from a metropolitan area,
thus necessitating time-consuming and expensive commuting, the
liberally educated professionals and the intelligent and ambitious
young corrections officers may wonder whether another type of
employment in a city might offer more in salary, interpersonal
diversity, and greater richness of cultural stimulation. Thus,
localites and older employees tend to be better satisfied or at
least reconciled to isolation, small-town subculture, and the
hopelessness of working with society’s rejects.
The hot-cold effect or calm-before-lhe-crisis aspect of work in
a penological facility makes sustained, well-staffed, and earefully planned programs of rehabilitation very tenuous. In a popu
lation composed of (and I almost cringe to say this) life’s losers,
yes, multiple losers, it is hard to do what is relatively easy to do
with eager, tuition-paying, bright, healthy teenage college stu
dents. Many incarcerated adult female felons are losers in these
respects: they have had less than an average chance (1) for pre
natal and early life nutritional sufficiency, (2) for lifelong
adequate medical and dental care, (3) for proper educational and
recreational socialization, and, (4) for the opportunity to iron out
the wrinkles of adolescence before they were thrust into the
maelstrom of premature adult responsibilities at the most unsupportive level of society. They are also often losers because of
their socio-economic origins, their race, their sex, their residen
tial neighborhood, their lack of knowledge of protective legal
rights and services, etc. These handicaps have allowed them to
drop through the criminal justice filters until finally the last one
dropped them into the prison system itself. This is not to say

that all inmates are of working class origins, that they are all
innocent of all legal protective devices and maneuvers, that all
their families have been chaotic splintered menages, that all their
neighborhoods have been hot beds of gambling, prostitution, skid
row degradation, and petty and not-so-petty racketeering! Some of
them have very obviously come from “good” backgrounds, but
somehow, somewhere a socialization cog has slipped, resulting
in ignorance, near-neurosis or near-psychosis, which helped such
persons become criminalistic or involved with criminal types.
Is it Marxist to claim that our capitalistic society does have
inherent in it a loser/winner corps of people? Is it subversive to
suggest that our criminal justice system may favor people who
are clean-cut, verbally articulate, well educated, skillful in their
art or profession, well mannered and poised, etc., as opposed to
those who are rough and ready, ill educated in the use of Lnglish
or lurking in the shadow world of shaky bilingualism, schooldropouts, chronically unemployed, habitually inept? Is it beyond
human imagination to think that judges and jurors are also frail
human beings, and that in spite of a selective process, they also
may be subject to community mores and societal prejudices
regarding religion, race and nationality; that they too are actors
in family dramas; that they worry about their reputations and their
professional peer group acceptance; that they, in sum, are not
Olympian gods who may somehow snatch objective truth from the
welter of earthly and earthy subjectivity?
What I am trying to suggest is that any human system or
institution is frail, weak, and subject to infimiities. Let us deal
gently with each other, for God alone can discern the quality of
human justice and the need for mercy or the burdens-of-office of
those who are appointed to help order and regulate human society.
Our society’s survival demands our highest wisdom, our most
merciful compassion, and our most tender regard for our fellow
humans whatever their present estate, previous condition, or
alleged misdeeds.
Correctional institutional populations are increasing these
days and probably will continue to increase in number at least in
the near future. This means essentially that even adequate
reformative programs will lack materials and personnel to most
effectively bring about optimum results. New programs will take
time, money, personnel, and dedication to implement, whereas
current programs may be outdated, cramped physically, overused.
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undermanned, and completely frustrated by inadequacies and
public apathy and misunderstanding. Such is the fate of the
conscientious administrator who needs money, bureaucratic
support and approval, trained personnel, adequate space, and
staff support to mount new programs which might in some measure
hit a winning number in the Rehabilitation Sweepstakes.
In conclusion, is it false to characterize some reformatories
as being victims of public ignorance, or bureaucratic byzantinism,
of public apathy, of misunderstanding and belligerency, of forlorn
location; of having disturbed confused belligerent inmates, of
pursuing mutually contradictory goals, of succumbing to fashions
in criminal justice and public pressure, of experiencing some
instability among correctional staff, of enduring the crisis-calm,
calm-crisis aspect of institutional management and routine, of
living with the fact that reformatory inmates are a strangely
mixed-bag of people? Some imprisoned women are professional
criminals and have not the slightest interest in ever going
straight; some are societal weak-knees, easily influenced by
peers living on various levels of morality and legality or immoral
ity and illegality; some are quietly and unjustly “taking the rap”
for others out of a sense of loyalty and perhaps misplaced nobil
ily; some have found a home in the joint with friends, “family,”
food, the essentials of clothing and shelter plus recreational,
educational, medical, and sexual fringe benefits. Can we not say,
in all truth, that Reformatories Are Victims of forces and prob
lems of such magnitude that if their inmate success rate could in
fact be measured and were found to be ten percent, one would
have to believe that the age of miracles had returned?

PEACE WEB

Cobweb on the evergreens in
Misty fog of an autumn dawn.
Harbinger of heat or visual afterglow
Of a cool Fall night?
Still, still friendly calm —
Non threatening to a spider’s world.
Untarnished environment of peace
To an unknowing primeval creature
Far more cognizant of personal needs
Than sophisticated humans.
Seeking to pierce the fog
With puny beams of light,
Dashing to busied activity
In unaware greeting of the budding day
Sensing only annoyance with
Nature’s whitened moisture
Frenetically oriented to achieve and overcome
In the presence of an insignificant creature
Who lives in quiet harmony with new hope
For each timeless moment.
Elwyn M. Williams

MllIJ' ANII MAN

I see them still:
Grandpa’s lop-eared mules —
Kale and Queen —
Coming up the East Road,
Their lord in tow.
How far the days
I'hen thought of.
Kate, kneading her hay.
Dropped dead.
Qu een, in the back twenty.
Drawing lightning.
Mule and man.
I see them still:
Kate and Queen,
Going down the West Road,
I’heir lord in tow,
Heyond the windy fields of ever,
Norman Chaney
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DIRECTIONS

To reach 40, continue till you arrive at the T in the road.
Do not look back, but go left or right, understanding that
one is the road not taken.
Proceed, but not at all possible speed.
Enjoy the scenery!
When you come to the first bend in the road,
notice there is a Slough of Despond on the left
and a Hill of Paradise on the right.
Do not picnic! Bears are in the area.
Check your gas gauge. If you are not at least half-full,
consider early retirement. The natives are garrulous.
At day’s end, keep a journal. (Think of Johnson and Boswell
in the Hebrides.)
Resist traveler’s melancholia. And above all, do not try
to return to the place from which you came.
My friend, you cannot get there from here!
Norman Chaney
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Earl Hassenpflug

TO DWELL:
NOTES AND IlEFLEC I IONS UPON A THIP IX) 11ALY

How the children love to play in the deep dark recess which
the lower unit of the old kitchen cupboard affords them. And how
many children played in this cupboard cave before our first one
discovered it? For this space invites habitation. Our first child
enjoyed it fifteen years ago and to it her imagination will return
throughout her lifetime. Now, upon occasion, one may hear the
enraptured voices of three younger children who have squeezed
themselves into this fascinating abode. Yes, all three at once,
for they seek not solitude but the comfort of a nest perhaps.
There are paired cupboard doors in the lower unit which pro
vide for the comings and goings of the children. Head space is
assured by pulling out the doughboard-drawer unit. The drawers
may then be opened or closed at will from the inside of the
cupboard. And with the drawers open the children may reach down
behind them to latch or unlatch the doors through which they have
entered. The meaning of dwelling is enhanced by such small
spaces, drawers and niches deep with mystery and love. Here the
children are at home in a very special sense.
One might cite abundant evidence which indicates that many
in contemporary Western society do not feel at home in their
world. To answer the question whether we are at one with our
selves, with our fellows, with nature under the vault of the
heavens is to answer it in the negative. Nevertheless, belonging
is intimately related to being, to what it means to be human.
Perhaps as Gaston Bachelard has suggested, we belong from birth
and estrangement is acquired:
Before he is ‘cast into the world’ as claimed by a certain
hasty metaphysics, man is laid in the cradle of the house. And
always, in our daydreams, the house is a large cradle. A con
crete metaphysics cannot neglect this fact, this simple fact,
all the more, since this fact is a value, an important value, to
which we return in our daydreaming. Being is already a value.
Life begins well, it begins enclosed, protected, all warm in
the bosom of the house.^

Perhaps if we could internalize the shelters which have
enclosed man’s being, have served as the externalized centers
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of his being, the focus of the comings and goings that mark his
interactions with the world outside, we might deepen our own
sense of dwelling. A recent trip to Italy with my family provided
many opportunities to gain new insights into what it means to
dwell.
A number of experiences confirmed in me a cosmic sense of
dwelling. The first was the power and the pull of the interior
space of the Pantheon. The coffered dome is a structure so huge
and so strong as to echo the vault of the heavens. But this is
concrete, and we are assured, yet cannot comprehend, that this
majestic work was man’s doing. The dome, opening through a
giant oculus to the distant sky, links earthly and heavenly realms,
creates a vital center. One is humbled by the superhuman scale,
yet the spirit is elevated by its connection to the whole of the
cosmos.
In contrast to the scale of the Pantheon, the Arena Chapel at
Padua is a modest barrel-vaulted structure. In a circular plan,
such as that of the Pantheon, the whole space is centered. A
basilican plan is typically a path to the center, the apse. In the
Arena Chapel the painted panels do indeed move the eye along
the length of this path, but the more important visual link is sur
prisingly between the vaulted ceiling and the painted panels on
the walls. It is the painter, Giotto, whose vision of man s place
in the scheme of things exalts this space.
The vault is an intense blue with hard-edged gold stars and
circular medallions. The ceiling symbolizes that great vault under
which we dwell in awe and satisfaction. The painted scenes
depicting the life of Mary and the life of Christ are separated by
broad, ornamental bands. But the rich blue of the ceiling extends
down and appears again in the sky areas of the paintings. Thus,
each scene while remaining an entity, a composition, partakes of
the cosmic significance of the whole scheme.
Giotto stands between the Gothic period and the Renaissance,
the first with its other-worldly orientation and the second with its
focus on man and nature. He is recognized for placing his figures
in a believable space, in a natural environment, rather than
against a gold background in the Gothic tradition. With few and
noteworthy exceptions each scene in the Arena Chapel includes
a prominent architectural motif in the landscape. For Giotto, the
structures shaped by man fit within nature and the cosmic scheme.
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The panel in which the architectural motif is most conspicuously
absent depicts the betrayal. How appropriate the absence of this
creative symbol where the action typifies the corruptability of
man.
The strong design of the individual panels is well conveyed in
reproductions, and Giotto’s work thus provides instructive ex
amples for any who would become artists. What slides and repro
ductions cannot reveal adequately is the overall scheme of the
chapel. I found here in the Arena Chapel an amazing awareness of
what it means to dwell under the vault of the sky as participant
in a continuing creation.
The Arena Chapel is indeed a monument to the human spirit.
Yet our broader purpose in travelling within Italy led us to place
as much importance upon the effort to imagine what it might be
like to live in a tufa cave, an unmortared stone shelter, a white
washed hilltop community (which took its definitive shape in the
1500’s) as in the viewing of monuments. Although neglected in
architectural studies until recently, the forms of folk architecture
are no less exciting than the forms of the monuments which a
culture has produced. Vernacular architecture, because it com
prises the larger part of the built environment and because it
reveals more intimately the life of a people, can no longer be
ignored in shaping a view of life in a given culture, and in putting
into fresh perspective life in our own.
We followed the lead of Edward Allen' in visiting Apulia, an
area with a long history of building communities in stone. From
Martins Franca on a sunny morning in September we drove the
short distance to Massafra. Our interest there was in communities
carved into the soft tufa rock, both below level ground and into
the face of a cliff. There is evidence in the museum of Taranto of
occupation of natural caves in this area at an earlier date, but
the first carved communities are said to date from 754 B.C.
“The most intensive development’’ was between 717 and 843
A.D. “when the iconoclasts were in power in Byzantium” and
“sixty thousand monks fled to exile in Italy—(bringing) with
them their skills as painters of icons.”3 By the 11th century,
the population, monastic and secular, of all the caves around
Massafra grew to an estimated two thousand.”''
First I wanted to see the underground communities consisting
of units of three or more dwellings dug into the tufa around

Figure 1, Caves of Massafra
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ure 2, Cisternino
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Figure 3, Signor e signora Semeraro
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Figure 4, Paired trulli south of Martina, Franc

Figure 5, Paired trulli, diagram of interior

central sunken courts. We saw one such court with entrances into
three of its sides. The walls of the sunken courtyard now form
the foundation for above ground dwellings. The underground
communities seem to have all but disappeared, but because tufa
is easy to carve, they had early in the history of this area
answered the human need for shelter. (There are similar commun
ities in the loess belt in China^ and in the Sahara.)
Nearby, our guide unlocked a street floor door, and passing
through a chamber holding water storage facilities for current
use we descended tufa stairs into the past. There we discovered
a sanctuary, cruciform in plan, with paintings which we were told
date from the tenth and twelfth centuries. The top of the cross
was opposite the stairs, and like the arms was pronounced just
sufficiently to establish the form of cross and create one of the
three focal areas for worship. This sanctuary is a remnant,then,of
the underground community and a sister to the cave churches in
the nearby gravina.
After driving beyond the edge of town we descended into the
Gravina of the Madonna della Scala to the level of the two cave
churches carved into the southeastern cliff. We entered first what
we understood to be a tenth century church in which the frescoes
are fairly well preserved. The fresh flowers on the altar suggested
that the church is still visited for religious purposes. Neighboring
it is an earlier cave church without paintings. The only decoration
is the few crosses (of uncertain date) etched into the tufa walls.
The central column of tufa is missing. The ceiling curves down to
reveal the point where the column had been. Two remaining
columns were apparently adequate to support the weight over the
more open areas of the ceiling. These unpretentious churches
seem to have afforded minimal space for congregating. Next to
them is their Baroque successor, more than adequate in area
enclosed but perhaps otherwise unimpressive.
On this same southeastern wall of the gravina was the monas
tery and beyond it the pharmacy where the great variety of
medicinal herbs grown in the gravina were prepared and stored.
But my interest centered in the secular dwellings carved into the
opposite side of the ravine. (Figure 1)
Cave walls are several feet thick. Tufa is adequate in
strength when sufficient depth is maintained in walls and between
floors. The caves have flat ceilings and are generally fan-shaped,
the front side being narrow, the back wide and curved. Whatever
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the purpose of this plan,it served to allow the light which entered
the door to reach most of the carved-out space.
The caves as they exist today reveal accommodations in
design to facilitate living. Our guide carried a clump of dried
grass into one cave to dramatically point out the fireplace which
carried the smoke up through a chimney carved into the tufa to the
slope above. Attachments for hanging lanterns were carved into
the ceiling by removing the tufa on two sides and above a band of
material which forms the hanger. Niches in the walls provided
storage areas. One cave visited had a cistern with a square lip
raised about four inches above the floor level. A pebble dropped
into the shaft plunked into water below, although rain water is no
longer channelled into the cistern from the ledge outside on the
cliff face. The adjoining room was on a level about three steps
higher than the first. It had a window opening on the outside
wall, and opposite it a recess, which we were told had held a
wine or olive press. Below this niche a basin was carved into
the tufa floor, presumably to hold the vessel which was to
receive the juices. Such evidence of dwelling is fascinating.
But again and again we were reminded that what it means to
dwell is clearly to be seen in the people of Apulia today. I
questioned an old woman in black outside her doorway on a
Massafra street soon after we had come into town. She walked
half a block to enlist the aid of two men who were engaged in
conversation. One of them indicated that we should follow his
car in ours. He led us to a school in another part of town where
his brother who spoke English teaches. The teacher in turn
directed us to the Municipio where a guide was found for us. The
guide concluded a wonderful tour by introducing us to a man who
had recently opened a family restaurant. It is out of a sense of
belonging to the community that Italians in one place after
another reached out to welcome us. The meal which we enjoyed
in this family restaurant warrants description.
We were ushered into a small white room at the left of the
dining area which we had entered from the street. The smaller
room was well lighted through an ample window area. The atmo
sphere was pleasantly informal. We were, while we waited for the
first course, and throughout the meal, to meet each member of the
family who was present. The host and head of the family enjoyed
introducing first his wife and then his girls and a son-in-law. We
in turn enjoyed introducing our four children to them.
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The food was prepared simply. We ate spaghetti, then veal and
french fries. We drank the excellent wine of the house, mineral
water, and the children had their usual aranciata. The bread,
typical in Italy, had a firm crust and we found it delicious.
Before we were served our coffee we looked with the proprietor
at paintings by a local artist which were hung throughout the
restaurant. Clearly it was the work of an amateur. But perhaps it
is of some significance that throughout Italy, in one restaurant
after another, original works, often of some merit, are displayed.
We seldom saw a reproduction.
We had a good meal and ate slowly. We drank our coffee
leisurely. After we had paid our bill the proprietor brought out a
bottle of homemade liqueur, and with the few others in the
restaurant we exchanged toasts. His pride in his family and the
new family venture was clear. I wished him success. A man who
can transform a simple but delicious meal into a delightful
human encounter deserved success.
On the day following our visit to Massafra we drove the few
miles to Cisternino, up the hill to the edge of the old sector of
town, and parked the car. We walked through the narrow streets
of the beautiful city which had in time effectively utilized the
available space within defensive walls laid up in the thirteenth
century. Only a few traces of the wall remain today as a reminder
that they were a factor in shaping the city. We gazed at the
sculptural forms of the glistening whitewashed limestone facades,
the vaulted passages and the buttresses from one building to
another across the streets. (F’igure 2) Absorbed in my own obsei^
vations, I was unaware that we too were being observed. An
elderly gentleman having approached undetected asked us to
follow him. I helped him carry a large container of cooking oil,
and we stopped a number of times as he pointed out the most
interesting views of arches and stairs. His own dwelling was our
destination and one of the most beautiful spots in town.
We entered the ground floor vault which is the kitchen where
he introduced himself and his moglie, a gracious lady. Giovanni
Semeraro is his name. We were seated on a cot and served her
biscuits and his wine. He showed us his muddied shoes and
indicated that he grew the grapes on a plot outside the town.
This is an age-old pattern in which people dwelling in compact
communities, which afforded security, farm the lands outside the
town.
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Giovanni Semeraro and his wife live at the end of a walkway.
The kitchen is at the left. At the end on the ground floor is a
storage vault. At the right and up a flight and a half is the living
room. The rooms are not contiguous. The pattern of space utili
zation is therefore a matter of some interest.
Allen points out that, “Almost all [the dwellings] are basi
cally single floor apartments which are stacked above or below
others in narrow two or three story buildings. Most are quite
restricted in floor area, so those on the upper floors avoid
further diminution by having their access stairs outside the
buildings in the already narrow street. Inside, the simpler houses
consist of one and two rooms, often with lofts or attics. ^ As
space needs grew the flexible system of vaulting allowed one
space to be built upon another or arched over the street below.
The visual result is one of unity in material and color, (white
washed stone), with a maximum variety in the modification of the
basic sculptural forms.
One may assume that as a neighboring space became available
the Semeraros extended their occupancy within the complex of
vaulted rooms. Their kitchen is a simple barrel vault. The living
room is a much larger, more complex, vaulted structure, white,
well lighted and airy. Heavy dark curtains divide the living area
from the bedroom. As signor Semeraro pulled aside the curtain
we saw the elegant headboard of dark inlaid wood and above it a
holy picture.
The most important furniture in the living room was a round
table. A photo album was handy. Signor Semeraro seated my wife
at the table and we looked at pictures of his children and grand
children.
After agreeing to pose for a picture, signor Semeraro changed
his coat and his wife removed her apron before appearing outside
their kitchen door. It was a classic pose of husband and wife.
(Figure 3) He put his right hand on her right shoulder. In his left
hand he held his curved-stem pipe.
Then off we went again through the old town with il signore
holding the hand of our two year old daughter. We arrived at the
park on the cliff’s edge near where we had left the car, but,
signor Semeraro seemed uneasy about our approaching departure.
He led us back into town where at the entrance of a ground floor
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study on one of the town squares we were very graciously wel
comed by a man who spoke fluent English. Signor Vincent
Scarafile is a student of languages, a translator, and for two
years he taught school in the United States. After some conver
sation he started up a ladder for a book which he suggested I
might like to obtain when back in the States. Do you mean this
one?” I asked, as I pulled out my copy of Edward Allen’s, Stone
Shelters. He did, indeed, and since he had collaborated with the
author on the section on Cisternino, I asked him to autograph my
copy.
Signor Scarafile was happy to practice his excellent English
on the children. He was happy that they could understand without
difficulty. That was for him a true test of his command of the
language.
Signor Semeraro, we learned, was as frustrated as we were
that we could not communicate more adequately. But thanks to
signor Scarafile we were able to communicate the warmth we felt
toward him. There was no end to his hospitality. He would have
shown us the countryside. But with no adequate way of sharing
with him I could not accept. He therefore asked us to wait until
he could return home and get a bottle of his vintage wine for us.
As we waited we talked further to signor Scarafile and he
with the children. When signor Semeraro had returned with his
present we thanked him, said our “ariveriderci, and he was
gone. Such a warm human being.
Among the varieties of vernacular architecture there are,
throughout Apulia, shelters constructed of field stone laid up
without mortar. Best known are the trulli of Alberobello. Trulli
is the name for the developed form, stone houses with conical
domes laid up in concentric rings of stone, each successive ring
decreasing in circumference. Alberobello is an entire town of
such structures. More often trulli are found singly or a few
together in the countryside.
Because each room of a trullo is covered by a conical dome,
the plan of the interior spaces is evident from the outside. Link
ing each domed room is an archway. The walls are low, seldom
higher than the doorway. Exterior and interior walls are dressed
stone. Between the two wall surfaces is a stone rubble fill. The
dome as described earlier is covered with limestone shingles and
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the contour of the exterior of the cone is generally steeper than
that of the dome which forms the ceiling.
Two adjoining structures now abandoned in a field south of
Martina Franca illustrate the fully developed trullo. (Figures 4
and 5) The smaller structure, apparently the earlier of the two,
consists of two rooms which were not plastered. The second and
smaller room served as the kitchen and had a generous fireplace
area. This dwelling has a number of recesses in the interior
walls but no window.
The larger structure has three rooms off the larger (approxi
mately ten foot square) central space. Each of these rooms is
elevated one step above the central room. Below the floor of the
rear room is a storage space. Below the floor of the room to the
left is a cistern. Water channelled from the roof enters through a
pipe into a recess in the wall. From the bottom of the recess a
trough leads the water below ground into the reservoir. (We had
seen that same ingenuity in a cave at Massafra.) The room to the
right of the entrance has a window with a hinged wooden door. On
the opposite wall, about thirty inches above the floor, is a deep
recess with a shallow dome above it, (It might have been an oven,
but it had no vent, and I saw no evidence of a fire having been
made there. Indeed, this larger trullo had no chimney.) Cooking is
often done in a small open hearth kitchen beyond the dwelling,
perhaps because cooking inside adds to the condensation of
moisture on the cold walls, especially in wintertime. In this
instance it could have been done in the smaller of the two
adjoining structures.
The access stairway to the roof of the larger trullo is typical.
Figs, fave beans, and other crops are dried on the roof. Once dry
they can be stored inside on a wooden platform in the vaulted
space overhead. There is in this pair of structures much evidence
of living. Yet, of course, in this agricultural setting more time is
spent out of doors than inside. Lacking were the creature com
forts which in our culture we have come to expect, although in
Alberobello television antennae sprout from the roofs.
What these various dwellings in Apulia do reveal is an
integrity which the rapidly growing suburban communities in the
United States lack. We have few limitations in terms of materials
available and we use materials indiscriminately. In Apulia the
lack of wood and the abundance of stone has limited choice and

fostered conditions in which design traditions could grow. What
evolved made the kind of sense which strengthens the lives of
the individuals involved.
Suburban developments in Ohio reveal a combination of
impressive materials on the facade. Stone or brick on the first
floor level with vertical wood panelling on the second is common.
The sides and back are then variously stucco or horizontal wood
siding (honest materials with a low prestige value). It is not an
integrated structure but the symbol of a home that seems impor
tant. Realtors offer to sell “homes,” not houses. But we buy
only the facade; and although it is a “substantial investment,”
it takes an investment of quite another kind to convert a house
into a home.

FOOTNOTES
ICaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space (Boston; Beacon Press,
1969), p. 7.
^F^dward Allen Stone Shelters (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1969).
^Ibid., p. 5).
^Ihid.
^Bernard Rudofsky, Architecture without Architects (Garden City,
Doubleday, 1964).
^Edward Allen, Stone Shelters, pp. 135-136.
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ELEGY WKH TEN IN A CITY BASEMENT - WITH FOOI NOTES
(with apologies to Thomas Gray and W. Shakespeare)
Alas, poor Richard.^ 1 knew him, Spiro.^
Like you, he was considered by some a hero;
But his trusted advisers, both Bob^ and John,^
Who should have been fired but lingered on,^
Led him astray^ in a felonious way
That did credit to no one.
Then there was John, surnamed Dean,^
Who blew off the lid with considerable steam;
And John the judge,® who kept everything clean.
Another John^ — Martha’s,^® that is —
Paid little attention to official biz^^
Until he became the chairman of CREEP,
Which made a lot of Nixonites weep.
While we’re speaking of Johns and their ilk,
There’s the John^® who befouled himself with milk.
Now let’s take a look at dumb Ronnie,
A lad whom you’d hardly call bonnie.
He was pushed and shoved by President Dick,^®
But what he deserved was a good swift kick.^®
With the press he was most unco-operative;
Now, to use his own term, he’s inoperative.^^
And then there was Pat,*® the dour and fat,
Who always knew where the corpse was at;*^
But he concealed and distorted the facts
Until Dick was about to get the ax.
Like Ron, he stuck it out to the bitter end
And departed the scene with scarcely one friend.
Had Dick paid attention to Newsweek and T'me,^^
He still might be in’s political prime;
But he chose to listen to Ronnie and Pat;^*
Consider now, if you will, where he is at.^^
Like you, dear Spiro,President Dick
Resigned, as we’ve seen, just in the nick.
And thus accomplished his last political trick.
James K. Ray

r.0

FOOTNOTES
^Richard M. Nixon, thirty-seventh President of the United States,
1969-1974. Variously known as the greatest American President since
Abraham Lincoln, King Richard, and tricky Dicky.
^For readers with short memories, Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of
the United States, 1969-1973. Until his resignation in 1973 because of
federal income tax fraud, Agnew was the chief tub-thumper (with
apologies to Henry L. Mencken) for Nixon’s law and order program.
R. Haldeman, White House chief of staff, 1969-1973.
^John D. Ehrlichman, Nixon’s chief domestic adviser, 1969-1973.
%ntil 1973, when Nixon finally requested their resignations. By that
time, however, the fat was in the fire.
°As a result of the Watergate trial, who misled whom is somewhat
moot.
'John W. Dean III, personal counsel to President Nixon, 1969-1973.
®Judge John J. Sirica, Time's Man of the Year for 1973.
^John N. Mitchell, Attorney General of the United States, 1969-1972.
'^Martha Mitchell, quondam wife of John. In view of subsequent
events, was would be more accurate than is; but a rime is a rime is a
rime (with apologies to Gertrude Stein).
j^Such as the prosecution of the I. T. and T.
J^Committee to Re-elect the President
^^John B. Connally, one of Nixon’s several Secretaries of the
Treasury, 1973, and heir apparent to the Presidency until the Watergate
roof caved in. In happier times (before he became a Republican),
Governor of Texas.
^^Ronald Ziegler, Nixon’s press secretary, 1969-1974. The word dumb
is used both literally and figuratively.
I^See Time, CII,x (3 September 1973), 8.
I^You know where.
^'Politically, that is. As Nixon’s chief aide after the downfall in
Aumst, 1974, he did all right financially.
^”Patrick Buchanan, one of the several speech writers for Nixon and
Agnew. A humorless fellow with a Messianic complex; a firm believer in
the divine right of kings.
'^Poetic license.
^^AIso the Washington Post and the New York Times.
^^See footnotes 14 and 18.
^^See footnote 19.
^^See footnote 2.
^'*In view of President Ford’s subsequent pardon of Nixon, the latter’s
resignation was perhaps his penultimate trick.
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Sylvia Vance

HISTORY AS DRAMATIC REINFORCEMENT: VOLTAIRE’S USE
OF HISTORY IN FOUR TRAGEDIES SET IN THE MIDDLE AGES
Voltaire expressed on more than one occasion his basic
approach to history in the tragedy: while it need not appear there
as absolutely factual, it would be found in his plays as a true
depicting of the customs and mores (“peinture vraie des moeurs”)
of the times in which they were set.^ When critics^ judge that
Voltaire has been faithful to this aim, I think we can agree only
if we confine our criteria strictly to Voltaire’s ideas of history
and the historian’s task, and even then we must insist on some
qualifications. As a philosophe and historian his views on
history were utilitarian. As a playwright, his use of historical
material in his tragedies was usually subordinated to his dramatic
aims. We do not find history playing the role that it would later
play for such a writer as Tolstoy.3 For Voltaire, such a concept
as an abstract historical “flow” (considered impersonally) did
not exist and hence could not figure as a determinant of human
destinies or human institutions. The sense of history which the
two writers held is very different, just as both in turn differ from
the idealist views of many modern philosophers and historians,
such as R. G. Collingwood. (The doctrine of the latter was that
the historian has the obligation to attempt to reconstruct the
mentality of another age in his own mind, to penetrate behind the
historical phenomena he studies.) Before we approach here the
central question of how Voltiare used history in certain of his
tragedies, it will be fruitful to look at what his ideas about
history were, for his concepts of the historian’s task inevitably
affected his use of historical material for dramatic purposes.
Voltaire thought that history summed up the slow, painful, but
relatively steady march of human progress, and that it contained
moral lessons which could increase such progress. To this
extent, history was useful to the educational purposes of the
philosophes. There was no need for a historian to be overly
didactic about such values; the lessons would be clear if history
were appropriately written. Voltaire’s Pyrrhonism in regard to
historical “fact,” and his increasing concern for accuracy of
citation of sources, never eliminated from his work the positive
thrust of the propagandist interested in changing society.^ His
attempt to understand the past was to evaluate it in the light of
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the present. There was nothing historically invalid in this for
him, for he saw human nature as never changing, even though
governments, religions, and the influence of climate and geo
graphy caused differences in men. In this rationale for under
standing the past Voltaire resembled the other philosophes whose
views of the utility of knowledge were socially oriented, aimed at
the betterment of life here and now.^ This point of view is in
contrast, however, to that of the more modern idealist theory of
history which holds that the task of the historian is the recreating
of the past in his own mind for the purpose of understanding and
expressing the particular rationale of any given period in its own
peculiar integrity. From this optiqueCoWingv/ood calls Enlighten
ment history “anti-historical.”^ But in an eighteenth-century
perspective, the use of history for their own enlightening purposes
appeared legitimate to the philosophes. In Voltaire’s case, J. H.
Brumfitt suggests that one might say it is used as a warning.^
This use of history was not as a rule blatantly propagandistic,
however, for in common with other rationalist historians, Voltaire
appealed to the mind of his reader, and not so much to his imagi
nation or emotions. Voltaire is still considered by many to be one
of the greatest of Enlightenment historians, and Georges Lefebvre
calls him the founder of truly modem history.® With this judgment
in mind, we can sum up from our present point of view his
strengths and his limitations. As Brumfitt points out, his origi
nality lay in his selection of content rather than in original
research, and he was far superior to his predecessors in evalu
ating the role of the arts and sciences, of economic and constitu
tional changes, of customs and inventions, of the lives of
ordinary men.^ For Voltaire (as he put it in his article “Histoire”
in the Encyclopedie), history was “le recit Oes faits donnes pour
vrais” (“the recounting of facts presented as true”), but however
skeptical he might have been of what was reported, he was un
willing to speculate long on any internal motivation present in
historic figures beyond a quick judgment, often witty or ironic.
The kind of reconstruction of unknown material in which histori
cal novelists often indulged infuriated him. In fact, he carried his
own refusal to examine inner motives to the point where it is a
weakness in his writing.*® His reasons for this restraint were
partly prudence (as in the case of Peter the Great) and partly a
sense of the limitations of historical method: “...qui salt les
secrets ressorts des fautes et des injustices des hommes?”**
(“Who knows the secret motives of men’s errors and injustices?”).
They also stem from a general lack of psychological insight,

which Brumfitt calls a serious lack in a historian. Can it be any
less serious in a writer of tragedies?

When we now look at Voltaire as a dramatist (a role which to
him was a major one), we find that he saw in the theatre both a
ready path to literary fame and influence and an important means
of communication in an almost journalistic sense.He felt that
his particular challenge was that of renewing the genre of tragedy
— of “putting a new world outlook into an old literary form.”^^
Something in the air of the early eighteenth century — a growing
optimism, a belief in the possibility of improving the quality of
human life through science and education, a feeling (culminating
in Rousseau) that evil could not be native to the human soul —
all this was calling into question the fundamentals of classic
tragedy.'4 In a word, the “climate” was non-tragic, and the
challenge to Voltaire was no small one. His dramatic career can
be described as a constant search for means of renewing this
literary form which he valued highly as a treasure of civilization.
The use of history (innovatively, of French history) was one such
means. We can see, however, viewing from our present perspec
tive, that incorporating history into the tragedy posed for Voltaire
a double problem. The vision of history that he possessed is part
of the difficulty; the rest is what art and the genre he was using
do to the substance of history itself.
Certain critics, notably Henri Lion, have suggested that
Voltaire could not sustain the classic psychological tension for
five acts in a tragedy, and hence perverted the genre when he
resorted to the exterior physical action of historical events to
help him out. Voltaire himself (and his defenders later) saw as
entirely valid in tragedy the use of history to trace the effects of
men’s passions. 15 Whatever resiliency a definition of tragedy may
have, a major difficulty in Voltaire’s case is that in wishing to
keep its formal elements intact while reinvigorating it, he ruled
out the possibility of utilizing in the theatre his own greatest
strengths as a historian.
Classical tragedy by its very definition and nature limited
what history could do. Voltaire excelled in his portrayal of the
activities of artisans and merchants; these were the people who,
in Voltaire’s own words, were “fourmis qui se creusent des
habitations en silence, tandis que les aigles et les vautours se
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dfichirent.”(“ants who dig out dwellings in silence while the
eagles and the vultures are tearing each other apart.”) Tragedy
was by its nature concerned with these “aigles” and “vautours.”
ITie play of economic factors in history, the role of the mer
chants — these were seen as inappropriate subject matter in
tragedy, and Voltaire avoided them in his plays, as they would
not be avoided by other playwrights in the evolving drame
bourgeois.

We should note here that certain things tend to happen to
history in tragedies — certain obvious things. Primarily because
of the-limited time span and dramatic condensation, the nuances
of circumstances or historical motivation tend to disappear. (We
might call this the “spotlight effect,” to parallel Erich Auei^
bach’s “searchlight effect” in polemical writing.l'^) Because of
the time limit, events may have to be focused more closely
together than was actually the case. For example, Voltaire moved
back a few years the death of the Black Prince in order to have it
in the background of the circumstances leading to the slaying of
Don Pedre by his half-brother Henri. Another hazard to history
in tragedy is that love (or some other compelling dramatic
necessity) may take over, as it certainly does in Adelaide du
Guesclin, while the historical motivation for VendSme’s siding
with the English remains very unclear.
The other aspect of Voltaire’s double problem is that his
views of history limit him as a tragedian. His unwillingness (or
inability) to examine the inner motivation of character is a serious
flaw. And when it comes to plays set in the Middle Ages Voltaire
was again disadvantaged, for he did not fully understand the
basis for its coherence as a period in history — even though, as
Georges Lefebvre says, the Essai sur les moeurs is the first true
synthetic resume of the feudal period.Jo Voltaire the Middle
Ages appeared as a source of bad examples of the effect of
barbarous passions. He could admire great figures in it, even
Jeanne d’Arc. But notice how he did it: “...cette heroine, digne
du miracle qu’elle avait feint.(“...that heroine, worthy of
the miracle she had feigned...”) Skepticism can go too far:
Voltaire did not seem to realize that people could hold opinions
or be motivated by forces totally different from his own.
These limitations we note from our present perspective. But if
we try to shift to Voltaire’s point of view, I think we can see that
there are more possibilities than problems in the utilization of
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history in the tragedy. Perhaps the more legitimate questions to
ask here are from Voltaire’s perspective: What does he want to do
as a dramatist? How will he ask history to help him do it? For
we must, I think, seriously suggest (with Jack R. Vrooman) that,
with very few exceptions, when Voltaire wrote tragedies he sub
ordinated all other categories of thought to his dramatic aims.20
He could — and did — risk a tirade by Zaire (in Zaire, I, i) which
added nothing to the dramatic effect but which did aid the drama
tist’s own views, as Ronald Ridgway notes. But we agree with
Ridgway, too, as he continues, “Mais dans I’ensemble il a raison
de dire qu’il a ‘pretendu faire une tragedie et non pas un sermon’
(Best. 533); son premier souci est de captiver les spectateurs et de
s’assurer une reussite eclatante en suivant la direction de ses
propres talents et des tendances de I’epoque.’’^! (“But overall
he is right to say that he ‘intended to create a moving and inter
esting tragedy, and not a sermon;’ his primary concern is to
assure himself a resounding success by following the direction
of his own talents and of the tendencies of the times.’’) After all,
any propagandist purposes he had could not succeed if the play
did not.
If we may assume here as a point of departure that Voltaire in
writing tragedies wanted most of all to make people feel an
emotional reaction, feel the pathos of the situation, then we next
ask with him, what can history do for tragedy? In answering this
question it seems to make sense to talk first about general or
external factors, and then to talk about internal ones of dramatic
mechanism, though there is some overlapping of the two cate
gories.
First of all, history (in a more specific way than myth or
legend) could contribute to the elevation of tone appropriate to
tragedy. The sonorous list of great names of French history was
the novel variant of this general effect that Voltaire found very
successful in Zaire. Lusignan, for example, says in scene three
of the second act, “Quand Philippe a Bovine enchainait la
victoire,;/Je combattais, seigneur, avec Montmorency,/Melun,
d’Estaing, de Nesle, et ce fameux Couci.” (“When Philip at
Bovine was binding up the victory,/! was fighting, sir, with
Montmorency ,:/Melun, d’Elstaing, de Nesle and that famous
Couci,’’) There was a reverberation here that was helpful in
establishing a high tone characteristic of great men and great
events, honoring them in being part of the greatest of genres and
honoring tragedy in turn with their presence.
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Another advantage in using history, from Voltaire’s point of
view, was that it could be the handmaiden of the notion of the
relativity of truth as opposed to a universal or an authoritarian
notion. The fact that Voltaire’s propaganda was often open to
more than one interpretation — being more implicit than explicit —
served him well.22 It has been a durable commodity, anchored in
the relativity of truth itself rather than to any one of its incarna
tions. What better vehicle than a historical peinlure des moeurs
for making this point of relativity, with contrasting cultures incoi^
porated into the dramatic conflict of the play? This element is
especially strong in Zaire, though as Vrooman points out, there
is nothing inherently Turkish about Orosmane or Zaire, and there
is a certain ironic discrepancy between Orosmane’s saying (in
true Turkish fashion), “Mais il est trop honteux de craindre une
maitress.” (“But it is too shameful to fear a mistress.’’) and his
subsequent (non-Turkish) actions.23 But however imperfect, this
juxtaposition of varying cultures opened the door on occasion to
the contrast of “then” and “now” or of “we” and “they.”
History can also contribute its truth to help make the plot
seem plausible. Without elaborating here, thou^, on the long
seventeenth-century debate of the vrai and the vraisemblable, we
do need to note that this aspect of the use of history can be a
double-edged tool which may cut in the wrong direction — as
witness the major factual peripeteia in Adelaide du GuescUn.
Voltaire’s use of an incident he found reported in the Annales de
Bretagne stretched thin the credibility of his plot. Coucy’s
disobedience of VendSme’s orders to slay Nemours (based on the
Breton episode) contrived a happy ending to a tragic situation.
History can be a source of action, of spectacle, of tableaux,
and to Voltaire this aspect was very important. Through his early
interest in Shakespeare he saw the need for more action on the
French stage, and though his admiration for the Englishman would
diminish, his search for devices to enliven tragedy would not
turn far from this type of remedy. Particularly when the Comedie
Fran^aise stage was cleared of spectators (1759) his taste for
spectacle could be indulged (in Tancrhde) to include a warriors’
march and the panoply of the feudal jugement de Dieu. Voltaire
saw the feudal period as especially rich for this purpose of
spectacle. It was a source, in general, of a certain excessive
heroism24 and a certain grandeur of soul which could be useful
to the atmosphere of tragedy. In fact, Voltaire appears more
sympathetic to the feudal period in his tragedies than in the
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Essai, probably for the reason that on stage he wanted to appeal

to the emotions of his audience. Ridgway even suggests that the
spirit that animates Tancrede is so far from the ;iind-set of
Voltaire as historian that perhaps he was simply thinking in terms
of exploiting the taste for the Middle Ages which was beginning
to spread following the publication in 1753 of the Memoires sur
Vancienne chevalerie of La Curne.^^ It was a taste which had
been planted much earlier than that; between 1715 and 1748
twenty-seven works bad appeared in France on the Merovingian
period alone.^6 Voltaire, too, had helped create this predilection
with Zaire and Adelaide du Guesclin. But even more notable than
a possible appeal on his part to a certain growing taste is the
overall idealism of Voltaire’s plays of the feudal period as con
trasted to his history of these times, “II laisse generalement a
I’historien le soin de montrer le revers de la m^daille et de faire
les distinctions necessaires. Ainsi les nobles chevaliers de
Tancrhde et les vertueux croises de Zaire deviennent ailleurs
des enrages qui ’s’abandonnerent a tons les exces de la fureur
et de 1’avarice,’ et des ‘monstres ornes de croix blanches encore
toutes d^gouttantes de sang des femmes qu’ils venaient de
massacrer apres les avoir violees.’
(“He usually leaves to
the historian the task of showing the other side of the coin and
making the necessary distinctions. Thus the noble knights and
the virtuous crusaders of Zaire become elsewhere madmen who
‘abandoned themselves to all the excesses of fury and greed’
and ‘monsters decorated with white crosses still dripping with
the blood of the women they had just killed after raping them.’ ’’)
Doubtless Voltaire the dramatist was giving the audience the
picture of chivalry they expected, finding in its ideals a fertile
field for the tragedy. When we contrast this attitude of the drama
tist with that of Voltaire the historian, we realize that in the
plays Voltaire was not using history as a warning at all, as he
tended to do in his historical writing, but was using it instead as
a means of reinforcing one highly desirable quality of tragedy in
his attempt to reinvigorate the genre. For, most importantly of all,
history in his plays contributes to an accentuation of the element
of the pathetique.
In line with Voltaire’s concept of what history was, he saw
events in historical settings — as opposed to those of legends or
myths — as being not so inevitable, not the result of the gods or
fate, but the result of human error or chance.^® Hence the victims
are, in a sense, even more to be pitied than if they were the
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victims of the inevitable. To Voltaire, the element of the
was ver)' important, and worth enhancing in this
historical way. This last external characteristic of history as
used in Voltaire’s tragedies leads us directly into the internal,
structural elements, for the accentuation of the pathelique has a
more specific application than the general principle which Vrooman points out. In fact, it has a series of applications which we
might see as a kind of reinforcing of various aspects of dramatic
motivation or emotional effect. To see just how this operates, we
need to look at individual plays — in this case, the four tragedies
set in the Middle Ages — Zaire, Adelaide du Guesclin, Tancrede,
and Don Pedre.
pathelique

The earliest is Zaire (1732), the first of Voltaire’s plays to
incorporate the history of his own countrymen. Zaire, a slave of
the Saracens, is loved by her master Orosmane, sultan of Jerusa
lem. Zaire welcomes his love, even though life with him means a
denial of her Christian heritage. She does not know who her
parents were, but a small cross she wore as a child when taken
into the custody of the Moslems testifies to her early life among
the crusader Christians of Jerusalem. The retaking of this city
by the Moslems under Saladin (1187) in the historical event
underlying the action of the play, which takes place in Jerusalem
some twenty years later.
Nerestan, a Christian prisoner, had left Jerusalem (pledging
on honor to come back) in order to seek ransom money at the
French counrt. The first act of Zaire sees his return;Orosmane
rewards his courage with the freedom of many more Christian
knights than he was able to bring money to ransom. Orosmane
refuses, however, at first to free old Lusignan, descendant of the
kings of Jerusalem. Zaire is not to be freed, either — to Nerestan’s evident dismay. Orosmane, observing this, is conscious of
a twinge of jealousy. Zaire then succeeds in obtaining the free
dom of Lusignan, contrary to Orosmane’s earlier decision. As the
old man comes into the presence of Zaire and Nerestan, the cross
worn by Zaire and a certain scar of Nerestan’s reveal to Lusig
nan that his children (whom he had long thought dead) are these
two people. They find out the identity of their father, and realize,
of course, that they are brother and sister. Lusignan persuades
Zaire to declare herself Christian, just as an order comes from
Orosmane for the arrest of all the French soldiers. Lusignan
makes Zaire swear to keep secret their relationship.
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It was the rumor that the French fleet was heading for his
coasts that had brought about the order from the sultan to arrest
the French. Once that rumor proves false, Orosmane’s order is
revoked, and he permits Nerestan to see Zaire. Informed that their
father is dying, she agrees to be baptized, and not to marry
Orosmane. Zaire is torn and despairing as Orosmane seeks her
out for the wedding, and she flees. She feels that she cannot
reveal her becoming Christian. Orosmane, distressed and pei^
plexed, becomes jealous again when Nerestan’s note to Zaire
(arranging a meeting) falls into his hands. The meeting is for her
baptism, but Orosmane does not know this, and lets the note be
delivered to test her. When Zaire keeps the rendezvous, Oros
mane kills her in a jealous rage. Nerestan is brought in, in
chains, and then the truth of his relationship to Zaire is revealed.
Orosmane, regaining an apparent calm, frees Nerestan and gives
him Zaire’s body to return to France. He then kills himself.
In this play, the most striking example of the use of history
for reinforcing the pathelique occurs in the first scene of the
second act. One of the French soldiers, Chatillon, is here recall
ing the time when Saladin retook Jerusalem (1187), and his long
description of the actual shattering event in terms of “nos peres,
nos enfants, nos filles, et nos femmes” (“Our fathers, our sons,
our daughters, and our wives”) takes on a weight that is doubled.
It underscores the motivation that will cause Lusignan to say of
Zaire, “Mon Dieu qui me la rends, me la rends-tu chretienne?”
(“My God who returns her to me, are you giving her back as a
Christian?”) Not only does it reveal what Lusignan and the others
can never personally forget but it also ties the fortunes of the
characters in the play to a real event which the audience knew
something about from their own history as a nation. It is through
this sense of a pre-existing audience concept that the force of the
speech is enhanced, emphasizing in the process the aspect of the
pathelique. This speech by Ch'&tillon is also using history as a
time and space stretcher in the play (as memory serves in the
exposition of Phedre). Zaire takes place in the required time and
space limitations of tragedy, but here a recollection of historical
fact extends these confines to recreate for a moment the atmo
sphere of twenty years earlier.
This is the most striking example of such usage of history in
the play, but there are others. In a shorter passage (II, iii) a less
specific reference recalls (in a sort of appeal to the cri du sang,
the ties of blood kinship) the blood of twenty kings, of heroes, of
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martyrs that flows in Zaire's veins. Once again, the historical
reference stretches time for the audience. Another exeunple:
Ndrestan’s recounting of his parole to Paris brings briefly into
the play the court of Saint Louis (II, i), expanding the space of
the action and bringing it home to the audience.
We perhaps should return here for a moment to the general
point (noted above) on the pathitique in a historical play, where
the denouement hinges on human error or chance rather than on
fate. This can indeed emphasize the element of the pathetique,
but Voltaire does not let himself be served by this aspect of
history as well as he might, for the chance that operates is often
so fortuitous as to invite doubt. More than one critic has noted
that the simple word “brother” or “sister,” spoken in the
dialogue or appearing in Zaire’s letter (as could easily have
happened) would have avoided completely the tragic ending. We
can see similar weaknesses of plot in other of these plays set in
the Middle Ages. In fact, H. C. Lancaster suggests that in Tancrede the use of unlikely situations to build plot is so extreme
that “...he [Voltaire] gives us no feeling that what happens is
inevitable.”29 Luckily, his audiences did not seem to object to
these structural weaknesses, and this play, like Zaire, was
enormously successful. We are, however, left with the impression
when reading the plays that perhaps Voltaire’s plots do not
extract the full weight of the historical pathetique, even though
he used French history in an original way to reinforce this value.
The effective device of using history for enhancing motivation
and for time and space stretching, as we noted it in Zaire, was
not so much utilized in Adelaide du Guesclin (1734), a tragedy
set in the period of the Hundred Years War after the death of
Charles VI. In a sense, love simply takes over in the play; in
stead of the wealth of themes present in Zaire and the ingenious
use of history in its structure, we find a singleness of theme
(love) to which everything else is subordinated, including history.
To be sure, certain external advantages of using history are as
much present here as in Zaire; the audience heard the notable
names of the French Middle Ages and saw evoked the colorful
but tragic period of Charles VII, but there is no attempt to por
tray a conflict of cultures or values. What could have been pre
sented as a very real conflict — the motivations of the nobles
(like Nemours) who supported Charles VII’s claim to the throne
as against the motivations of those (like VendShie) who fought on
the side of the English — is treated so superficially that it loses
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almost all dramatic value. As Vend^me says when the brothers
meet (II,ii), “Oublions ces sujets de discorde et de haine.”
(“Let’s forget these subjects of discord and hatred.”) The only
conflict that really moves the play is that of two brothers who
love the same girl. Perhaps Voltaire felt that this was good
history, too; in the Essai he says, “...car I’amour influe presque
toujours sur les affaires d’etat chez les princes chretiens, ce
qui n’arrive point dans le reste du monde.”30 (“...for love almost
always influences affairs of state with Christian princes, which
does not happen in the rest of the world.”)
Bearer of an illustrious French name, AdelaTde du Guesclin
is loved by two titled brothers, VendSme and Nemours. VendSme,
a supporter of the English, had imprisoned Adelal'de in order to
get her out of English hands, and thus had saved her life. He
wants her to marry him, and his friend and supporter, Coucy,
points out to her that she is probably the only one who can bring
VendSme back to an allegiance to Charles VII, whom she and the
French faction (including Nemours) support. In the course of the
war, Nemours has besieged Lille, where Adelai'de is held prisoner
by his brother, but he does not realize that VendSme loves her
also until he is taken prisoner and they meet as enemy kin.
Nemours does not reveal to Vendome that he loves Adelai’de, but
the audience by this time knows that she loves Nemours and has
rejected VendOme. In an attempt to win her, Vendome promises to
leave the English side, but she still refuses him, saying that she
loves another. The jealous VendOme eventually discovers who the
someone is, and when Adelai’de still refuses to marry him Venddtne orders, in a rage, the death of his brother. He tells Coucy
to fire a cannon as a signal when the deed is done. Adelai’de then
offers to marry Vendfjme to save Nemours, but too late; the
cannon is heard from off stage. Then, remorseful, VendSme urges
Adelai’de to take revenge for the death, but Coucy comes back to
explain that the cannon shot was a false message, and that he
felt he best served Vend6me by disobeying his order. The lovers
are reunited, with the blessing of VendOme, who is not only
reconciled with his brother, but supports Charles VII as his
rightful sovereign.
The original 1734 version of this play was not successful.
The appearance of Nemours on stage when bloody, and with his
arm in a sling, his fainting, the cannon shot off stage — all this
was a bit too much realism for the audiences, to whose interest
in love Voltaire was trying to cater. It did not really matter to
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Voltaire in which historical setting this play of the two brothers
who loved the same girl took place. A 1752 version (Amelie ou
Le Due de Foix) takes place in the eighth century; the enemy are
the Moors. The original version was rewritten and performed in
1765; this time — with some strengthening of the love motivation
in VendSme’s character — the play was a success. Voltaire did
not, however, do much for the historical motivation. As Lancaster
points out, there are only a few lines to explain why VendSme is
collaborating with the English: “Le malheur de nos temps, nos
discordes sinistres,/ Charles qui s’abandonne a d’indignes
ministres/ Dans ce cruel parti tout I’a precipit6.” (“The mis
fortune of our times, our ominous dissensions,:/ Charles who is
abandoning himself to unworthy ministers/into this cruel decision
all these have precipitated him.”) VendSme himself does not set
much store by his reasons; he is ready to change sides simply for
Adelaide’s love. (One might think oneself in the latter part of the
twelfth century with its knight and lady literature instead of the
early fifteenth.) As for Nemours, no subtlety here, in any histori
cal sense. “Le roi le veut” (“The king wills it”) explains or
justifies his actions whenever love does not. And in Adelaide’s
case, when she cites serving her king as the reason she refuses
to marry Venddme, it is actually only an excuse because she
loves Nemours instead.
One looks almost in vain for the kind of time-stretching
evocation of the past or the historical “memory” of motivating
events. There are a few passages of this nature, but they are all
brief. Adelaide’s speech setting the scene of the action at the
beginning of the play is very unspecific, “J’entends de tous
cdtes les clamours des soldats,;/ Et les sons de la guerre, et les
cris du tr4pas./ La terreur me consume;” (“I hear on all sides
the noise of soldiers/ and the sounds of war, and the cries of
death./ Terror is wearing me away”). In scene two of the same
act she is very specific, though, in wording her feeling about the
weight of history that she bears: “Ici du haut des cieux, du
Guesclin me contemple:/ De le fidelite ce h^ros fut I’exemple:;/
Je trahirais le sang qu’il versa pour nos lois/ Si j’acceptais la
main du vainqueur de nos rois.” (“Here, from high in the heavens,
Du Guesclin regards me:/ This hero was the very example of
faithfulness:/ I would betray the blood which he shed for our
laws/ If I accepted the hand of the conqueror of our kings.”) In
scene one of the second act the playwright’s tactful gesture to
the Bourbon family appears; Coucy proclaims, “Et suivre les
Bourbons, e’est voler a la gloire.” (“And to follow the Bourbons
63

is to fly to glory.”) It is Coucy also who evokes an episode in
French history, briefly but dramatically, in attempting to recall
VendOme from his preoccupation with Adelaide (Act II, scene vii):
Lorsque Philippe-Auguste, aux plaines de Bovines,
De I’Etat dechire repara les ruines,
Ouand seal il arreta, dans nos champs inondes,
De I’empire germain les torrents debordes;
Tant d’honneurs etaient-ils I’effet de sa tendresse?
Sauva-t-il son pays pour plaire a sa maitresse?
(When Philip-Augustus, on the Bovine plains,
Restored the ruins of the torn state,
When alone he arrested, on our flooded fields.
The overflowing torrents of the German empire:
Were so many honors the result of his love?
Did he save his country to please his mistress?)

Later, Nemours recalls the constable Du Guesclin (III, i) in
explaining to Dangeste that it is not defeat that has disheartened
him — for did not the great constable himself suffer reverses?
Rather, it is Du Guesclin’s niece whom Nemours at this point
believes guilty of loving that supporter of the English, Vendome.
The most interesting use of memory in the plot of the play has
nothing to do with history at all; it is the personal recollection by
Venddme (V, ii) of his childhood with his brother Nemours, which
tender recall moves him to countermand (a bit late) his order to
Coucy to slay this very brother. It also leads ultimately to his
conversion to king and vertu, for this play does not have a tragic
ending.
Coucy’s disobedience of Venddme’s order to slay Nemours is
based on an incident which Voltaire had found in the Annales de
Bretagne. In 1387 a duke of Brittany had ordered the seigneur de
Bavalan to assassinate the constable de Clisson. Bavalan told
the duke he had carried out his orders, but after the duke had
fully realized the horror of his act, Bavalan revealed that he had
disobeyed the duke, for he loved him too much to let him be
guilty of such a crime. True tale or not, one wonders if the
version involving the brothers in the play must not have appeared
too contrived to the audience, and have contributed to the
“gayety of the parterre” which signaled the failure of the original
version. The tension of the true and the plausible, the vrai and
the vraisemhlable, has often been an intriguing imponderable of
aesthetics.
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Tancrede (1760), first played while France was at war, once
more used a setting from the Middle Ages (1005, Sicily) and much
spectacle for background. At the time he wrote it, the sixty-sixyear-old Voltaire was, as usual, engaged in a multitude of other
projects and in his normal heavy correspondence resulting from
his situation in exile. The suppression of Helvetius’ De Vesprit
and the suspension of publication of the EncyclopSdie were on
his mind. Of all the things that might be said about this fasci
nating play (it has its moving moments even when read), we need
to focus here on a different utilization of history which, instead
of reinforcing motivation or stretching time by reaching back into
the past, increases its effectiveness by reaching forward into the
present. In this play, the forward reach is aimed at arousing the
sympathies of the audience for the characters and the author; its
use must have been specifically premeditated (rather than implied
in a general way as in Zaire), but it is not blatantly propagandistic.

At the beginning of the play, Tancrede (who is French and a
descendant of the Norman adventurers who had helped the city of
Syracuse throw off Moslem rule) has been away from Syracuse for
some time. As rival factions there consolidate to meet the danger
from combined Greek and Moslem forces, the French, especially
Tancrede, are accused of aiding their enemies. Tancrede is
singled out to be banished forever from the city and his property
is to become state property. Amenai'de, the daughter of the aging
ruler, had been raised at the Byzantine court where she had met
and fallen in love with Tancrede. She is sure that he is still
loved by the people in the city, and she anticipates that on his
return there he could be the kind of oppressed hero who would
win support. Amenai'de’s true love is Tancrede, but it is also
revealed that Solamir, the Moslem leader, had loved her when she
was at the Byzantine court. Through the dramatic device of an
ambiguously worded letter (sent by Amenai’de to Tancrale but
intercepted by soldiers of Syracuse and believed to have been
addressed to Solamir) Voltaire put his heroine in peril of her life.
Her death for treason is called for, but the feudal jugement de
Dieu is to settle her guilt or innocence. Tancrede, though he
believes on the basis of the letter that she now loves Solamir,
offers to be her champion, and he defeats Orbassan who is fight
ing on behalf of the State. Then, still unrecognized by all but
Amenai'de, Tancrede becomes a leader of the forces of Syracuse
as they face a decisive battle with the Moslems and Greeks. A
heroic victory leaves TancrNle gravely wounded, but before dying
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1
he learns that Amenai'de loves him after all. Before she joins him
in death she reveals who he is, and then furiously consigns to
hell “...et vous tyrans et my patrie,;/ Et ce senat barbare, et ces
horribles droits/ D’egorger I’innocence avec le fer des lois!”
(“...both you, tyrants, and my fatherland,;/ And this barbarous
senate, and these horrible rights/ Of slaughtering innocence with
the sword of the laws!”)
Throughout the play there are various references to the unjust
letter of the law, and it was the dramatic force of these historical
passages, easily oriented to the contemporary situation, that gave
Tancrede much of its power. On top of this, the fact that the
pli^t of the lovers in the play was indeed pathetic gave a
poignancy to the contemporary parallels that increased their
effectiveness. The successful “reach into the present” of
Voltaire’s use of history in Tancrede was thus a double movement
of aroused sympathies that made it work so well for the play
wright. Sympathies stemming from contemporary events were
directed to the characters of the play and were reinforced in turn
by the truly pathetic situations seen on stage. And not only were
the lovers sympathetic characters in this sense; all the characters
shared or came to share this quality. It is illuminating to go
through the play and note those passages which in a general way
orient the dramatic situation to contemporary French society, for
the author’s concerns were recognized and shared by at least a
portion of his audience.
The most dramatic evidence of this fact is that in 1762 the
play was closed down for a time, after applause and shouts of
“Broglie, Broglie” greeted the line (I, vi) “C’est le sort d’un
h4ros d’etre persecute.” (The marshal de Broglie had recently
been exiled to his estates.) In other lines, Voltaire’s own situa
tion in exile could easily be imagined. Such, for example, are
Amenai'de’s words in regard to Tancrede (11, i), “Un heros qu’on
opprime attendrit tous les coeurs;/ II les anime tons quand il
vient h paraitre.” (“A hero who is oppressed softens all hearts;/
He quickens them all when he appears.”) These lines exactly
predict the reception which Voltaire himself would receive when
he finally did come to Paris in 1778. Voltaire, who as historian
was shocked by the primitive forms of justice in the MiddleAges,
utilized as playwright their dramatic qualities — but he also
appears to have been honing some fine-edged comparisons to his
own day.
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The final accusation by Amenai'de (quoted above),that the law
itself had been unjust and had punished innocence, had been
preceded by several passages suggesting that unjust laws produce
independence of thought and action. For example, the sixth scene
of the fourth act finds Amenai'de saying, “L’injustice h la fin
produit I’independance.” (“Injustice, in the end, produces inde
pendence.”) She is setting other values above the laws of her
country. This is in marked contrast to the attitude of her father,
Argire, who has stated (I, iv), “J’ai pendant soixante ans combattu pour I’Etat;/ Je le servis injuste, et le cheris ingrat.”
(“For sixty years I have fought on behalf of the State;/ I served
it [when it was] unjust, and I cherished it [when it was] ungrate
ful.”) So it is of no little interest that those who had condemned
Tancrede to exile come to recognize their error in the most inter
esting recognition scene in the play (IV, xi). Argire says of him
self and the other nobles of the council, “0 juges malheureux,
qui dans nos faibles mains/ Tenons aveuglement le glaive et la
balance/ Combien nos jugements sont injustes et vains/ Et
combien nous egare une fausse prudence!;/ (}ue nous etions
ingrats! que nous etions tyrans!” (0 unfortunate judges, who in
our faltering hands/ Hold blindly the sword and tbe scales/ How
much are our judgments unjust and vain/ And how greatly a false
prudence leads us astray!/ How ungrateful we were! How much
were we tyrants!”)
The first scene of the second act is especially of interest as
regards the use of history; Amenaide contrasts the present harsh
law of Syracuse operating against some of its own people (notably
Tancrede) with the attitude of heroic F'rench ancestors who took
alarm at an enemy;
Que cette loi jalouse est digne de nos maitres!
Ce n’etait point ainsi que ses braves ancStres
Ces genereux Franqais, ces illustres vainqueurs,
Subjuguaient I’ltaHe, et conqueraient des coeurs.
On aimait leur franchise, on redoutait leurs armes;
Les soup^ons n’entraient point dans leurs esprits altiers,
L’honneur avait uni tons ces grands chevaliers:
Chez les seuls ennemis ils portaient les alarmes;”
(How fitting is this jealous law to those who govern!
It was not thus that his brave ancestors,
Those generous French, those illustrious conquerors
Subjugated Italy, and won over hearts.
People liked their sincerity, and respected their arms;
Suspicions never entered their lofty minds.
Honor had united those great knights:
They sounded the alarm only against enemies.)
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Could one miss the implied “reach into the present” here?
Tancrfede, before fighting Orbassan in the jugement de Dieu
(III, v), tells him that he (Tancrede) may be as necessary to tbe
state as Orbassan himself is. These are strong words, for
Orbassan represents a staunchly patriotic point of view, in which
service to the state is the highest of honors. It is this patriot
that Tancrede then opposes, though he will in turn be of great
service to his own state in scenes that expand and redefine the
narrow patriotism which had exiled him. Loredan’s judgment in
scene one of the fifth act restores and elevates the position of
Tancrede; Voltaire could well have intended that the audience
recall another great man, writing in exile.
Don Pedre (1774), which was never performed and which
Voltaire said was not meant to be, is notable for our purposes
here both as another (though less effective) example of the
appeal from the past to the present, and as a case where historio
graphical concepts and dramatic motivation were in conflict. The
kingdom of Don Pfedre, legitimate son of Alphonso XI of Castile,
is being threatened by Henri Transtamare, his bastard brother. To
this illegitimate son the father on his death-bed had promised
Leonore. He had also invoked for Henri the aid of Charles V of
France to win control of Castile, and the arrival of Du Guesclin
with a French army is imminent as the play begins. An aggressive
senat (the Spanish cartes, with whom Henri is allied) is chal
lenging the power of Don Pedre.

Leonore is at court, having been brought there by Don Pedre.
She has become sympathetic to the king, and — in fact — loves
him, though she finds court intrigue most distasteful. She hopes
to reawaken him to virtue, in spite of his unsavory reputation;
Leonore finds his corruption superficial and blames it on the
series of mistresses he has had. She even tries to get him to
pardon Transtamare who, she points out, is after all his brother.
Transtamare has come to claim Leonore as his rightful bride,
and cannot understand her support of Don Pedre. Don Pedre at
first feels that, in urging reconciliation with his brother, Leonore
is betraying his best interests, but then he realizes that he has
wrongly questioned her motives. He is not so flexible in regard to
the senat, but refuses to bow to its claims to power in the king
dom. He calls “gothiques ramas” (“disorderly Gothic remains”)
what they dare to claim as fundamental laws. Influenced by
Leonore, he condemns Transtamare to exile rather than to death.
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Transtamare dares Don Pedre to strike him down while he yet
can, as the news comes that Du Guesclin and a French army have
arrived.
Don Pedre prefers, as the legitimate ruler of Castile, to deal
with Transtamare through the law. Du Guesclin, once on the
scene, extricates Transtamare from the exile about to be enforced,
acting in good faith on the death-bed request of Don Pedre’s
father to support Henri. Don Pedre elects to give battle rather
than give in to Transtamare and Du Guesclin. The French con
stable is the victor, overcoming a valiant Don Pedre, who is
taken prisoner and treated honorably by Du Guesclin, only to be
slain by Transtamare as soon as he is taken to him. In his
relationship to L4onore, Transtamare remains callous to the end.
We heard him early in the play evaluating her as a p iece of
property of which he was being deprived. Just after Don Pedre’s
death he tries to claim her (V, iii), saying that as full as the day
had been of changes, she could not be blamed for one more —
and she should change her loyalty to him. But Leonore, despair
ing, kills herself, and Du Guesclin strips Transtamare of his
knightly rank, calling him unworthy of it. There the play ends,
leaving Transtamare to go on to rule Castile, and leaving history
to attach to Don Pedre the title of “cruel” which Voltaire
questioned.
It is the judgment of Paul Hie in his study of this play that
“the Castilian experience was captured perfectly” and that the
achievement of the play consists in its historiographical image of
Spain.He further points out that dramatic necessity, exempli
fied in the role of Leonore, had to strike a compromise with
historical reality; the judgment of history concerning the charac
ter of Don Pedre is not that of Leonore. Lion’s earlier study of
the same play emphasized its nature as a piece de combat in
Voltaire’s hostility to Parlement, drawing a parallel between the
Castilian sinat (Voltaire’s word) and the Parlement of Paris.
That the senat is the calculated villain of the play, says Lion,
made contemporary political propaganda.^^ We can acknowledge,
perhaps, a certain validity here, though as Hie points out, the
parallel between senat and Parlement is ambiguous (as is their
villainy) and the Spanish cartes more justly correspond to the
Estates. But be that as it may, in dramatic terms the device of a
historical reference projecting into the present failed Voltaire
the playwright in Don Pedre. It did not set in motion the double
pull of sympathies which made it successful in Tancrede. There
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is too much ambiguity in the Interplay.
The question has been raised, for example, whether Transtamare is a sympathetic character, up to that point in the play
where he slays Don Pedre. To this reader Transtamare is not
sympathetic in view of his callous attitude from the beginning
that Leonore is “un bien qu’un tyran me dispute ” {“a piece of
property that a tyrant disputes with me”). But the fact that the
question can legitimately be raised is one of the ambiguities. A
more serious one involves the character of Don Pedre — the very
question which Voltaire wanted to examine anew. Leaving aside
what others say of him (which in the plot is certain to be colored
by political loyalties), leaving aside what Leonore (who loves
him) thinks, we find that Don Pedre’s own view of himself is
ambiguous, confusing his role as king and his human personality.
Un roi qui fait le bien ne fait que des ingrats” (“A king who
does good creates only ingratitude,”), says the ruler in response
to Leonore s pleas for peace. Yet he realizes that he has been
wrong to question her motives, and he evaluates his own fate as
that ...d eloigner tons les coeurs ” (“alienating all hearts”)
(II, v). He sees himself as a man unable to accept love when it is
offered. For this major reason, a reinforcing of audience sym
pathy toward this historical personage could not have operated
as it did so successfully in Tancrhde, even though Don Pbdre
accepts Leonore’s influence later in the play.
^ When we remember, however, that Voltaire said that Don
Pedre was not meant to be performed, we are entitled to wonder,
I think, if he was not here writing more consciously as a historian
than a playwright — a historian interested in a reinterpretation of
the character of Pedro the Cruel. Given this motivation, which
his own Discours preliminaire to the play would seem to empha
size (however much Lion wished to discount it), Voltaire wrote
the history he wanted to write, doing some violence in the pro
cess to the clarity of the play he used as vehicle. If, as Hie
proposes, the chief achievement of the play is its historiographi
cal image of Spain, what then can we say about Voltaire’s view
of the character of the late Middle Ages which it reveals? Is he
closer here than in the other plays to his studied condemnations
of the Middle Ages in the Essai sur les moeurs? It would seem
so. Don Pedre, who elected to deal with challenger Transtamare
under the law in strong kingly authority, was slain after defeat
by the brutal power of a victorious rebel — a rebel w bo had
thereafter been found legitimate by the cynical historical process
Voltaire wished to expose as, in fact, anti-historical.
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Disregarding the code of chivalry, supported by an opportunis
tic Pope and an aggressive senat, Transtamare was of his time,
of the brutal, irrational side that Voltaire condemned. Don Pedre,
ahead of his day (as we see him in the play), sought a firmly
centralized authority dependent on law. He refused, however, to
include the claims made by the senat for the so-called funda
mental laws which would limit a king’s authority. Voltaire made
Don Pedre’s law more equivalent to enlightened reason, for the
influence of Leonore, who loved Don Pedre as a person and not
as the king, would have succeeded (he suggested) in creating in
Don Pbdre that strong, reason-governed monarch so desirable to
the State. Instead, the brutal act of Transtamare set the stage
for the creating of the historical image of a cruel Don Pedre. In
this play Voltaire the historian attempted to reform the cynical
judgment that history loves a winner, and show us another Don
Pedre, who is more than a loser who deserved to lose. The ensu
ing ambiguities of character are perhaps more true to history
than helpful to drama. The double pull of dramatic reinforcement
cannot operate here. The ambiguities that Voltaire wrote into the
play might perhaps also make us less quick to condemn Don
Phdre as a propaganda vehicle than such critics as Lion have
been. Voltaire was, after all, writing a love story for the theatre.
It was the potential and actual force of Leonore’s love which
was the justification in the play for a change in and reinterpre
tation of Don Pedre’s character. The dramatist wished to use his
art to convince of the possibility of a different historical judg
ment of Pedro of Castile.

In these four plays, all set in the Middle Ages, I think we can
see four differing aspects of the use of history in tragedy, with
certain common elements relating both to their common setting
and to Voltaire’s concept of history. As effective as the histori
cal reinforcement was for him in Zaire and Tancrede, I wonder if
we do not have to question, finally, if — in theory at least —
history is as effective in this dramatic role as myth or legend.
Perhaps the very real effectiveness of history is purchased at a
high price, when we look at the total esthetics of tragedy and
not just at Voltaire’s plays. For in its very specificity of time
and place and person (however relative that may be and however
many different historical interpretations of the event may be
possible) there is perhaps something in history itself that inter
feres with the most effective recognition scene of all, that shock
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of identification by the audience when, in viewing the fate of the
tragic hero, they say to themselves, “There, but for the grace of
God, go I. At least, the question deserves to be raised, for
there is another aspect in the relationship of historical portrayal
to dramatic effectiveness that we could not examine with Vol*
taire. He used history (in his sense of it) often effectively for
his purposes, hut his very conception of history eliminated the
brooding sense of an imponderable movement beyond individual
human control which — almost as a kind of fate — Tolstoy, in
another age and another culture, used so effectively in the novel.
One cannot help but feel that this different conception of history
is more at home in tragedy than was Voltaire’s eighteenthcentury variety.

NOTES
^The qu^otation from Voltaire, appearing in the author’s preface to
Rome Sauvee on Calilina, is taken from the Moland edition of his works
(V 210), the edition from which passages from the plays have been
cited in this essay. Translations into English throughout this paper are
by the present author.
20ne such judgment is that of Jack R. Vrooman, Voltaire's Theatre:
The Cycle from Oedipe*‘ to '*Merope,** Studies on Voltaire and the
Eighteenth Century, Vol. 75 (1970), 189.
^Isaiah Berlin, in The Hedgehog and the Fox (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1970) treats the question of Tolstoy’s philosophy of history.
W. H, Walsh in his Philosophy of History (New York: Harper and
Row, 1960) defines propaganda as the use of the past for the aims of
the present (p. 112).
^Where Voltaire differs from most of the rest of the French Enlighten
ment historians is in his refusal to use medieval history to support some
particular theory of the origins of political institutions. He thought that
we simply could not know enough about it to make such an interpreta
tion.
^R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1946), p. 77. Not all phil osophers who accept the idealist view accept
also Collingwood’s position that this process is an intuitive act. Com
pare, for example, W. H, Walsh, Philosophy of History, pp, 56 ff.
‘J. H. Brumfitt, Voltaire Historian (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1958), p. 168. A s an example of Voltaire’s views on the uses of history,
we note in the article “Historiographe” of the Dictionnaire philosophique, “Heureusement merne un peuple entier trouve toujours bon qu’on
lui remette devant les yeux les crimes de ses peres; on aime ales
condamner, on croit valoir mieux qu’eux. L’historiographe ou I’historien les encourage dans ces sentiments; et en retrayant les guerres de
la Fronde et celles dc la religion ils empechent qu’il n’y en ait encore.”
(“Fortunately an entire prople always finds it good to have put before
their eyes the crimes of their fathers; they like to condemn them; they
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believe themselves better. The historiographer or the historian encour
ages them in these feelings; and by retracing the wars of the Fronde
and those of religion they prevent there being any more of them.”)
^Georges Lefebvre, La Naissance de V historiographie modeme
(Paris: Flammarion, 1971), p. 124.
^Voltaire Historian, p. 47; p. 75.
^^Ihid. pp. 162-163.
1 Woltaire, Essai sur les moeurs, ed., Rene Pomeau, 2 vols. (Paris:
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Essai sur les moeurs is 1756.
l^Robert Niclclaus, ‘‘La Propagande philosophique au theatre au
siecle des lumieres,” Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century,
Vol. 26 (1963), 1236.
^^Vrooman, Voltaire’s Theatre, p. 189.
1‘^George Steiner, The Death of Tragedy (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1968), pp. 114 ff.
l^Vrooman, Voltaire’s Theatre, p. 39.
Volta ire, Essai sur les moeurs, I, 757.
^^Erich Auerbach, Mimesis (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1968), p. 404.
l®Lefebvre, La Naissance..., p. 128. Voltaire as historian worked
mainly from printed sources (as opposed to manuscript materials) and
eye-witness accounts; there were none of the former and few of the
latter for this period.
^^Voltaire, Essai sur les moeurs, 1, 752.
^^Vrooman, Voltaire’s Theatre, p. 190.
^ ^^Ronald S. Ridgway, La Propagande philosophique dans les tra
gedies de Voltaire, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century,
Vol. 15 (1961), 96.
^^Nicklaus, ‘‘La Propagande philosophique au theatre...,” p. 1236.
23Vrooman, Voltaire’s Theatre, pp. 95-96.
24Voltaire, Essai sur les moeurs, 1, 454.
^^Ridgway, La Propagande..., p. 190.
2f>Franklin L. Ford, Rohe and Sword (New York; Harper and Row,
1965), p. 233.
27Ridgway, La Propaganda..., pp. 191-192 (interior quotations from
Essai sur les moeurs).
28Vrooman, Voltaire’s Theatre, p. 185.
C. Lancaster, French Tragedy in the Time of Louis XV and
Voltaire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1950), 11, 417.
3®Voltaire, Essai sur les moeurs, I, 754.
olPaul Hie, ‘‘Voltaire and Spain: The Meaning of Don Pedre.”
Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, Vol. 117 (1974), 171.
•^^Henri Lion, Les Tragedies et les theories dramatiques de Vol
taire (Paris: Hachette, 1895), p. 362. Voltaire made no mention of this
element in Don Pedre’s situation when he wrote of him in the Essai sur
les moeurs: by 1774, he did add in the play a rebellious body of nobles.
In the years between the two treatments of Don Pedre, Voltaire had
written the Histoire du Parlement de Paris, in which, Brumfitt says, he
was perfectly fair to Parlement. This document was related to the
ministerial campaign against Parlement in the late 1760’s and ‘‘may
have been written at government request.” (Brumfitt, Voltaire Historian,
p. 70).

Harold B. Hancock

THE HISTORY OF TOWERS HALL

For more than one hundred years Towers Hall has served the
needs of students, faculty and administrators of Otterbein College
Probably every student who has enrolled since 1871 has attended
classes in it. At first the structure, then known simply as the
main building or the Administration Building — for short the
Ad ’ Building — served almost every campus need — as adminis
trative offices, classrooms, library, conservatory, art studio, and
laboratory. Music left in the 1880’s to occupy the home of former
President Davis (site of Carnegie Library) across the way,
science moved to Saum Hall in 1898, and art occupied new
quarters in Lambert Hall in 1909. But Towers Hall has continued
to be used as the main classroom building down to the present
time. After World War II the basement was finished off to be used
for a business office and storage space, and in the 1950’s the
interior was remodeled to provide for library stacks, new offices,
and classrooms.
Originally Towers Hall was built to replace the main building
which was destroyed by fire during the night of January 26, 1870.
President Lewis Davis believed that the fire was set by an
arsonist. Only a small amount of laboratory equipment and furni
ture was saved from the building. Practically all the classroom
furniture, the college library of 3,000 volumes, and the libraries
and furniture of the three literary societies (expanded to four
later in the century), were destroyed.
Undaunted, President Davis called a faculty meeting in his
living room across from the smoking ruins at four o’clock in the
morning and made plans for the continuation of classes in the
three remaining structures on campus and in the homes of pro
fessors. With the help of trustees, village residents, faculty,
alumni, students and friends, money was raised to construct a
new main building. (His act of courage at a time of adversity
inspired a student pastor who was an alumnus to undertake the
rebuilding of a church seventy-five years later. The edifice was
destroyed by fire in the 1940’s in New York state, and the young
student pastor, then in seminary, thought of the courage of
President Davis at a time when the principal college building
was destroyed. Within a year the church was rebuilt.)
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The building of Towers Hall began late in the summer of
1870, and some of the materials from the ruins were used in the
new structure. Until recently, when the walls were painted in the
basement, charred bricks could be seen. The architect was R. T.
Brookes of Columbus, and the contractor was A. W. Cornell of
Newark. The cost was $29, 335. All building materials came by
railroad via Otterbein Station (Flint) because a railroad had not
yet been built to Westerville.
The date of completion was fixed as August 1, 1871, but the
contractor went bankrupt, and the structure was still far from
complete when the trustees met in October. They threatened to
bring suit against the securities of Mr. Cornell, and the building
was completed for classroom use by the end of the year. A visitor
in December found much to praise about the well-ventilated
classrooms, administrative offices on the first floor, library
facilities, and well-arranged chapel, seating 800.
Towers Hall is a handsome Victorian Gothic structure with its
pointed windows and doorways and towers. Small wonder that a
student of college architecture (Johannesen) found much to praise
about the building:
The Victorian style is no longer merely a pictorial veneer
wrapped around a classical body. It is highly sculptural. Cube,
octagon, pyramid, and the truncated pryamidal form of the
mansard are played against one another, sometimes harshly,
but always dramatically. The windows look as if they had been
cut into building blocks. And though the materials are the same
as those in earlier buildings, one has the impression of more
color — and the roofs are striped. The Otterbein Towers are a
fitting symbol of a new era — the era of post-war national and
industrial expension, the end of the predominantly agrarian age
in America, and symbolical of a new era in higher education.

In 1972 the building had its face lifted with the repointing of
bricks, the erection of a new roof, and the waterproofing of the
basement. The next summer two of the towers were dismantled,
for they were in bad condition, and replaced.
For many years the administrative offices of the college were
on the first floor of Towers Hall. The President occupied the two
small rooms left of the south doorway, while the Treasurer and
Registrar used the front rooms to the right of the south entrance.
Traditionally the room in the southwest corner was the religion
classroom, and those in the northeast corner were used by the
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English department. At the beginning faculty members did not
have separate offices. Each one was assigned a classroom, which
he also used as an office. His chair and desk were on a raised
platform. Each room had its own stove from which pipes led to a
flue in the wall. Smoke escaped through one of the numerous
chimneys on the roof.
The classrooms in Towers Hall could tell a thousand stories —
of friendships made, of romances, of class anecdotes, of admired
teachers, and pranks. Until recently a cow, a horse, or chickens
were the occupants of some classrooms once or twice a year.
Chairs were frequently stacked in the form of a pyramid. After a
senior night out one professor came to class one morning to find
his desk and classroom chairs carefully arranged in neat rows
under a tree on the front lawn.
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Soon after Mr. Sanders Frye came to the Otterbein campus as
business manager in 1947, an employee in the boiler room, which
was then located on Maple Street, saw several students running
out of Towers Hall at four o’clock in the morning. He investigated
and found a cow in a classroom on the second floor. When two
janitors arrived at six o’clock, they laboriously backed the cow
down the steps, took it to a farm across the creek and cleaned up
the classroom. The business manager, boiler operator, and
janitors agreed not to mention the incident to anyone. Certainly
the perpetrators of the trick were surprised next day when they
arrived in Towers and found no trace of the cow! To this day the
names of alumni who participated are not known.
Today students sometimes ask why there is a large rounding
wall on the west side of the hallway on the first floor. Old-timers
know that this was because of the adjacent chapel. Here for
seventy-five years were held compulsory daily chapel, lectures,
and college gatherings, including athletic pep rallies. In this
auditorium in April, 1917, a public meeting of citizens promised
support for President Wilson in World War I. For almost fifty
years the congregation of the United Brethren Church (Church of
the Master, United Methodist) met in these quarters, an edifice
not being built across the street until 1916. Since it was the only
auditorium of any size on campus for many years, plays, variety
shows, and the college lecture series were held here. A balcony
above, approached from off the second floor hallway, seated two
hundred students.
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The college chapel was often the scene of pranks. Sometimes
when the audience rose to leave, they found that the doors were
barred, necessitating that someone climb out a window to remove
the barriers. On one occasion in the 1890’s some ambitious stu
dents carefully dismantled a farm wagon and reerected it within
the chapel loaded with sand. How mystified some of the students
were next morning when they attended chapel. How could such a
large vehicle have been moved in there? The rostrum had a habit
of disappearing and reappearing. On one occasion a note to the
President indicated that it was in a cornfield adjacent to the
campus. The owner would not permit his corn shocks to be dis
turbed unless they were carted to the barn. After students were
hired to do this work, the rostrum was still not located! (One
reader of the above incident was reminded of an escapade
involving placing the automobile of a student in the hallway of
Towers in the 1950’s.)
One morning in 1948 several professors unlocked the doors to
their classrooms and discovered not a single classroom chair in
sight! Where could they have vanished? At chapel time they were
discovered carefully piled up in the locked balcony. Later the
culprit was discovered to be the student night watchman!
In 1951 Cowan Hall was erected, leaving vacant the old
chapel. One of the purposes of the Centennial Campaign of 1947
had been to raise funds for a library. The decision was made to
convert the chapel into a three-floor stack and to add a reading
room on the west side of Towers Hall. For twenty years the
Memorial Library served students and faculty until a separate
building was erected.
To guard the library from possible invasion by seniors on their
night out, the librarian in 1957 remained in his office, writing his
annual report and watching for any disturbances. Early next
morning the seniors appeared and graciously offered to drive the
wearied guard home. Upon his return he found that all the library
tables had been set with place mats, knives, forks, spoons,
glasses, and plates, as if for breakfast.
Originally the college library was on the second floor in
Room 25. At a later time it also included Room 24. In the 1880’s
the library was open once a week for one hour with a professor
in charge. After the Carnegie Library was erected in 1908,
blackboards were placed on all sides of Room 25 for the use of
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the classes of such distinguished professors in mathematics as
Professors Frank E. Miller, Benjamin Glover, and Fred Bamforth,
and in foreign language of Professors A. P. Rosselot and Gilbert
Mills.
About the time that Sandy Frye became business manager on
January 1, 1947, the state of Ohio informed the college that the
worn wooden stairways leading from the basement to the third
floor must be replaced because they were a fire hazard. Benham,
Richards and Armstrong drew the architectural plans. Since the
two stairways were identical, only one set of plans was drawn up.
Several contractors bid on the project, but one was $16,000 lower
than any other bidder. Later it was discovered that the contractor
had made an error and figured only the cost of one stairway, not
two. The college received two stairways for the price of one!
On the third floor are the literary society rooms. At the time of
expansion in enrollment after World War II, commonly referred to
as the “GI bulge,” three of them were converted into classrooms,
but the fourth was left untouched with its well constructed chairs,
stained glass windows and doors, glass chandaliers, beautiful
rostrum with special desks for the President, secretary and critic,
busts, pictures, worn wall to wall carpeting, wall decorations and
motto, “Quaerere Nostrum Studium Est.” Some of the items from
the other society rooms were also moved into these quarters.
Student members of the societies had always been responsible for
selecting and paying for the furnishings. The men’s literary
societies — Philomathea and Philophronea — disappeared during
the twenties and the ladies — Philalethea and Cleiorhetea —
during the thirties.
Soon after Mr. Frye became business manager in 1947, he was
asked to check the safety of Philomathea and Philophronea, since
they would be used for meetings during the Centennial celebra
tion. The floors seemed shaky. Mr. Frye and “Tink” Sanders
crawled under the floors and found that they were supported by
two wooden trusses running north and south. They were about four
feet high and showed no sign of undue strain or over loading. One
end of each truss was supported by the brick walls of the chapel
below. The other end of each truss was supported by a fourteen
inch high truss concealed by the common walls of the literary
society rooms, but it was supported by a steel column in the
exact center of the chapel. The two men felt that the two rooms
were perfectly safe, but they had only a few chairs placed in
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each room, in order that people would stand in the back near the
brick walls. Fortunately nothing happened during the Centennial
celebration, but several years later when the old Chapel was
being remodeled into book stacks it was discovered that the
steel column lacked some four inches of touching the bottom
chord of the truss in the literary society walls, which accounted
for the slight shake in the floors.
What memories these literary society rooms bring back to
alumni: memories of debates, lectures, musical programs, and
training in parliamentary procedure. Through the 1950’s it was
said that evidence of parliamentarian training received in those
meetings was evident in the deliberations of the Otterbein faculty
as well as in other meetings outside of Westerville. The records
of the literary societies, now in the Otterbein Room in the library,
are the best continuous source for the social history of the
college before 1920.
Elsewhere on the third floor, after remodeling the south end of
of the building, was the headquarters of the psychology depart
ment. In a small room nearby were once kept rats for experimental
purposes. In the extreme southeast corner was located Otterbein’s
first radio station, WOBC, founded by Professor Lee Shackson of
the Music Department in 1948. The north end of the third floor
was once a storage area, but the need for classroom space led to
the construction of three classrooms. Today they are faculty
offices.
Few Otterbein students have visited the attic. A narrow steep
stairway leads to a large open space in which are stored a few
pieces of furniture, a stained glass window on the floor, and a
few pipes, p^rom these quarters one enjoys a wonderful view of
the campus and hears the booming of the college bell.
Th e college bell, weighing over one thousand pounds, was
purchased in 1872 from Vanduzen and Tift of Cincinnati. A
favorite prank was to steal the bell clapper. In the 1940’s some
students ran a rope from the bell clapper to the Science Building
and rang the bell intermittently after 2:00 p.m., until they were
discovered. Inspired by this prank, others became more inventive.
Taking fine fishing line, they fastened the bell clapper to the
limb of a tree. When the wind moved the branch, the bell rang.
The line was so fine that college authorities were some time in
locating the source of the annoyance.
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As late as World War II the basement was unfinished, except
for a portion of the southwest end which housed a janitor and his
family until after 1920. When Dr. A. P. Rosselot arrived at Otterbein as a student in 1901, he spent the night in these quarters
since no one else was around. When Mr. Frye became the busi
ness manager after World War II, he used the south end as an
office and asked Forest “Red” Moreland, who had just arrived to
work for the college, to finish off the rest of the basement. Half
of each day he devoted to smoothing the dirt floors. By the use
of an eight-foot stick he determined when everything was level,
and then an order was placed for a shipment of concrete. Almost
a year passed before all the floors were finished. Today the
basement is used for printing and storage.
Most of the graduates of the college do not know that Towers
once contained two hand operated elevators used for hoisting coal
to the upper floors for the coal stoves and for bringing down
ashes. At the present time the openings to the elevators in the
basement are blocked up. A member of the class of 1943 recalls
a prank in which some students, for no particular reason, filled
the shafts with classroom chairs. According to him, splinters
from the chairs thrown down were still visible many years later.
Near the print shop on the west side of the basement in the
corner is the mail room. Formerly it was occupied by the tele
phone exchange.
Going outside the building and entering the west door of the
basement, the visitor enters a hallway which leads to the Reading
Development Center. At one time these quarters were occupied by
the Otterbein Room. Adjacent is a vault used by the treasurer
and registrar of the college. In the northwest corner of the base
ment is the public relations office. Formerly it was occupied by
the Learning Resource Center. Around the corner to the extreme
north is a pleasant classroom. Towers 1, an area developed into a
classroom at the time of the GI bulge.
In retrospect. Towers Hall has had a distinguished career,
serving a great variety of purposes. Only in recent years has it
borne the name of Towers. When administrative offices were
moved into the Carnegie Library and that structure was renamed
the Administrative Building, President J. Gordon Howard decided
that the old main building, formerly known as the Administration
Building, needed a new name. The first choice was “Old Main,”
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but it was soon replaced by the more appropriate name of Towfers
Hall. The towers of the building adorn college stationery, and the
alumni magazine bears the name Towers. Alumni always have
fond memories of the oldest building on campus.
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CON I KIFlU rORS
Norman Chaney is Assistant Professor of English. He also
teaches in the Department of Religion and Philosophy and is at
work on a book on the subject of philosophical anthropology.
Harold H. Ha ncock is Professor of History and Chairman of
the Department of History. He is a widely published historian,
and a specialist in the history of the state of Delaware.
Earl Hassenpflug is Assistant Professor of Art and Chainnan
of the Department of Art. His essay in this issue of the Miscel
lany, as well as his essay in the 1971 issue (on African art), are
manifestations of sabbatical experiences.
Albert E. Lovejoy, Professor of Sociology and Chairman of
the Department of Sociology, presents in this issue of Miscellany
an essay conceived during a recent sabbatical.
Robert Price, Professor of English, Emeritus, is a widely
recognized author. Rabbit on the Lawn is a recent volume of
poetry by Professor Price.
James K. Ray, Associate Professor of English, Emeritus, is a
frequent contributor to this journal. He is a satirist in the tradi
tion of Byron.
Paul I,. Redditt is Assistant Professor in the Department of
Religion and Philosophy. His areas of special study are textual
criticism of the Old I'estament and Far Eastern Religions.
Elwyn M. Williams is Vice President for Development and
Public Relations. This is his first appearance in the Miscellany.
Sylvia Vance is a frequent contributor to Miscellany. She is
Assistant Professor of French and Acting Chairman of the Depart
ment of Foreign Language.
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